Intimate Liability: Emotional Harm, Family Law, and Stereotyped Narratives in Interspousal Torts by Nicola, Fernanda G.
William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law
Volume 19 | Issue 3 Article 2
Intimate Liability: Emotional Harm, Family Law,
and Stereotyped Narratives in Interspousal Torts
Fernanda G. Nicola
Copyright c 2013 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl
Repository Citation
Fernanda G. Nicola, Intimate Liability: Emotional Harm, Family Law, and Stereotyped Narratives in
Interspousal Torts, 19 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 445 (2013), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
wmjowl/vol19/iss3/2
INTIMATE LIABILITY: EMOTIONAL HARM,
FAMILY LAW, AND STEREOTYPED NARRATIVES
IN INTERSPOUSAL TORTS
FERNANDA G. NICOLA*
ABSTRACT
Tort liability expanded in the twentieth century, a shift scholars
generally attribute to the reorganization of tort law around the fault
principle. In privileging compensation and deterrence, this reconfigu-
ration ended various restrictions on liability, long viewed as arbitrary,
including limits to the recovery for emotional harm and interspousal
immunities. Tort and family law scholars alike portray the end of such
immunities as a milestone for gender equality. Their elimination
enables spouses and partners to secure compensation for emotional
and physical abuse arising in intimate relationships. Yet, tort law
is not operating in this way. On the contrary, by endorsing a family/
market distinction in private law, scholars have pushed intimate lia-
bility claims between spouses away from tort law and into family law.
As a result, compensation for emotional harm is mostly actionable
in tort when it occurs in the realm of the market rather than in the
realm of the family.
Today, intimate liability is left to the agendas of political re-
formers. Feminists on the left and social conservatives on the right
are shaping the litigation on interspousal torts, but they have oppos-
ing political agendas. While feminists seek to create more gender
equality and protect women both within and outside the marital bond,
social conservatives seek to strengthen traditional family values by
favoring married plaintiffs only. Both sets of reformers, however, care
more about promoting their respective agendas than redressing the
harm suffered by those who do not fit their stereotyped narratives.
The current intimate liability regime has a class bias. Plaintiffs
in upper-middle-class marriages can benefit from interspousal tort
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litigation, particularly during divorce proceedings, because they can
pay for private liability insurance. Low- and middle-income married
couples, who cannot afford such liability insurance, cannot bring
these claims and instead are at the mercy of tort lawyers operating
on contingency fees. Furthermore, unless litigation on emotional
harm happens during the breakup of a marriage, it is almost impos-
sible for non-married plaintiffs to recover damages. These include non-
married partners, cohabitants, and same-sex couples. To overhaul
such unequal outcomes, this paper suggests departing from a market/
family dichotomy in tort law. It advocates reconceptualizing intimate
liability as a stand-alone tort remedy in order to deter abusive emo-
tional behavior enabled by relationships in which economic and emo-
tional dependency are deeply intertwined.
INTRODUCTION
I. THE MIXED LEGACY OF INTERSPOUSAL TORTS: BETWEEN
WOMEN’S EMANCIPATION AND THE PROTECTION OF
FAMILY HONOR
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Efforts to recover for stand-alone emotional harm perpetrated
by spouses and intimate partners confront obstacles in the current
tort law regime.1 This confrontation occurs despite the existence of
liability for stand-alone emotional harm in recent decades, despite the
abolition of interspousal immunities, and despite the broader shift
of mentalité from community to individual values in the family and
family law.2 In the twentieth century, the end of interspousal immuni-
ties signified an important victory for gender equality.3 Gender equal-
ity advocates championed these developments, viewing the emergence
of modern interspousal tort litigation as both a broader intimate liabil-
ity regime and as protection for the individual rights of wives abused
physically or emotionally by their husbands.4
Today, this is no longer the case. “Unloved” by tort scholars,5
considered a threat to the affective privacy of married couples by
1. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reconstructing Fault: The Case for Spousal Torts, 79
U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 243 (2010).
2. After World War II, the legal consciousness shifted from broad social intervention
in family relations through state regulation to the rebirth of subjective rights and indi-
vidualistic forms of protection through enforcement by private law or transnational courts.
See Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy, Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189,
263–64 (2011). Judith Areen has described this post-1960s shift in family law as “the ten-
sion between the doctrine of family privacy and protection of the rights of individual family
members.” Id. at 269 (quoting JUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW
xix–xx (1978)). Areen further explained that “[c]ritics of the family privacy doctrine argue
that it is unfair to the needs of abused wives or children. But at the same time, growing
fears about the intrusiveness or clumsiness of modern government have provided new
support for the policy of leaving families alone.” Id. at 269–70.
3. See id. at 273. But see Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce:
Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 328–29 (1997) (explaining that de-
spite the progressive reforms of the twentieth century supported by an energetic women’s
movement, two crucial arguments, often used in tandem, about domestic harmony and
privacy have allowed interspousal immunities to survive, at least in practice).
4. See id. at 272–73.
5. See John C.P. Goldberg, Essay, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1501, 1519 (2002) (“[W]e must recapture the idea that tort cases are con-
cerned with the focused task of identifying and remedying instances in which an actor has
wronged another, as opposed to providing localized compensation or insurance schemes,
regulating antisocial conduct for the good of society, or the like.”). Goldberg argues that
torts should not be used to remedy “perceived social ills.” Id.
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common law judges,6 and with a very limited impact on tort litigation,7
tort liability for stand-alone emotional harm in intimate relationships
has fallen out of favor.8 This article argues that three interrelated,
ideological, and doctrinal factors have sharply limited its scope and
excluded a majority of plaintiffs from recovering from intimate lia-
bility torts.
First, by relying on what Janet Halley and Kerry Rittich call
“family law exceptionalism” (FLE),9 tort and family law scholars have
reproduced a market/family distinction in private law reasoning.10
They have treated intimate liability as a matter for family law,
which is concerned with vulnerabilities and emotions, rather than
tort law, which is concerned with spreading costs among litigants in
the market.11 In reducing tort law to the goal of compensating dam-
ages and deterring unsocial behavior,12 tort scholars are reluctant
to regulate family matters that, in their eyes, should be left to love
and emotions rather than money and commercial interests.13 There-
fore, family law appears better equipped to address emotional harm
between spouses and intimate partners. This approach has reinforced
family law exceptionalism in tort law,14 namely the idea that private
law is characterized by a market/family distinction in which the first
is associated with universal and individualistic values and the second
with localized and organic ones.15
6. See, e.g., Drake v. Drake, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (Minn. 1920) (emphasizing the tradi-
tion of respecting the “tranquillity of family relations” by denying interspousal tort claims),
overruled by Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729,
730 (N.Y. 1961) (noting the public policy concern that certain types of tort claims might
flood courts with frivolous litigation).
7. See infra Part II.C (discussing the limited number of tort lawsuits between spouses
and intimate partners).
8. See Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?,
55 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1317–26 (1996).
9. Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law:
Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism—Introduction to
the Special Issue on Comparative Family Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 753 (2010).
10. See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1497 (1983).
11. Halley & Rittich, supra note 9, at 754.
12. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 525
(2003) (explaining the compensation-deterrence theory of tort law as deterring “antisocial
conduct” and compensating injured parties).
13. For instance, tort scholars have argued that compensatory damages are, at best, in-
appropriate when family law is already available to address spousal disagreements and di-
vision of property through divorce. See, e.g., Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 1342–43.
14. See Janet Halley, After Gender: Tools for Progressives in a Shift from Sexual
Domination to the Economic Family, 31 PACE L. REV. 887, 897–98 (2011) (discussing the
history of FLE).
15. See Duncan Kennedy, Savigny’s Family/Patrimony Distinction and its Place in the
Global Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 811, 813–14 (2010).
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Second, feminists on the left and social conservatives on the right
are driving the legal changes behind intimate liability. These reform-
ers hold distinct ideals of family life which reflect broader political
and cultural struggles over how to reconcile principles of equality and
community. These two groups, who find themselves on the same side
of this legal reform battle, are motivated by opposing goals. Feminists
seek to revamp intimate liability to compensate women for harm in-
flicted by emotionally abusive men.16 They reject those doctrines that
have immunized the family from interspousal torts in the name of
affective privacy.17 To achieve gender equality and compensate women
for emotional harm, they aim to protect the dignity and sexual auton-
omy of women via the torts of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress (IIED).18 Feminists seek to protect women’s individual rights
in order to promote gender equality while mitigating financial losses
triggered by no-fault divorce settlements.19
Social conservatives seek to reintroduce fault and moral blame
to penalize the cheating spouse who has undermined the marriage
and more broadly, the honor of the family.20 Rather than advocating
sexual autonomy, they are driven by a romantic, paternalist ideology
which welcomes the intervention of tort law in the family in order
to protect spouses and punish their paramours.21 By revamping the
old amatory torts,22 social conservatives seek to assign moral blame,
protect the integrity of marriage, and preserve family honor.23
16. See Dalton, supra note 3, at 390; Deana Pollard Sacks, Intentional Sex Torts, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1051 (2008).
17. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2173–74 (1996).
18. See Sacks, supra note 16, at 1051.
19. See Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
191, 198 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
20. Fernanda Nicola, What’s Love Got to Do With It?: Stereotypical Women in Dis-
positionist Torts, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 650, 658 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012);
Jill Jones, Comment, Fanning an Old Flame: Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conver-
sation Revisited, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 61 (1998).
21. Id.
22. Amatory torts or “heart balms” are old tort actions between spouses or lovers that
included breach of marriage, seduction, alienation of affection, and criminal conversation.
See David M. Cotter, Heart Balm Torts: Why Your Client May Not be Safe from Liability,
FAM. ADVOC., Spring 2005, at 14.
23. See Linda L. Berger, Lies Between Mommy and Daddy: The Case for Recognizing
Spousal Emotional Distress Claims Based on Domestic Deceit That Interferes with Parent-
Child Relationships, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 449, 516 (2000) (“[T]orts arising out of the marital
relationship, and other kinds of domestic misconduct should remain an eligible ground for
an IIED claim. Otherwise, some spouses will be allowed to seriously harm their partners
through conduct that would be tortious if it were directed at anyone else.”).
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Third, the background rules modeling tort litigation have made
recovering damages for intimate liability practically impossible for
a majority of plaintiffs. These rules include contingency fee agree-
ments for lawyers, shielding insurances from family torts,24 and lack
of liability insurance in intimate relations.25 In particular, non-wealthy
individuals and those who are not married are practically excluded
from the current regime of intimate liability.26 Due to the absence of
liability insurance, tort lawyers who rely on contingency fee agree-
ments are reluctant to bring stand-alone emotional distress claims
between middle- and lower-income spouses or non-married partners.27
This article adopts an intellectual and social history framework
to show how legal change occurs and how this has ultimately shaped
the current intimate liability regime without a clear evolutionary
trajectory but rather through constant ideological conflict.28 Part I
analyzes the decline of interspousal immunities in the twentieth cen-
tury as part of the feminist battle for gender equality and women’s
civil rights. The feminist agenda in favor of intimate liability emerged
and took root only in the late 1980s, in part because feminists felt
that the classic dignitary torts incorporated and reflected pernicious
gender biases.29 At the same time, however, feminists and liberals
were battling on a different but interrelated ground, namely the elim-
ination of amatory torts, which reflected the outdated principle of
coverture.30 According to this principle, the wife was conceived as prop-
erty of the husband so that, as an indivisible unit, neither party could
24. See Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 137 (2001)
(explaining that while the family member exclusion has been struck down in automobile
insurance policies, this has not happened for other mandatory insurance policies such
as for homeowners or renters in which there is both a family member and intentional
torts exclusion).
25. See Jennifer Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance “Family Member
Exclusions”: Shared Assumptions, Relational and Liberal Feminist Challenges, 17 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 251, 252 (2002).
26. See Tom Baker, Essay, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Lia-
bility Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2005) [hereinafter
Baker, Liability Insurance] (explaining that because of the current tort litigation regime,
liability insurance policy exclusions become de facto limits on tort liability); Tom Baker,
Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 275, 314 (2001) (“The liability insurance norm means that, except for institu-
tional defendants or an outrageous wrong, liability insurance has become a prerequisite
for tort liability.”).
27. Baker, Liability Insurance, supra note 26, at 4–5.
28. See Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 58 (1984).
29. See Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: Exploring the Gap Between
Civil Rights and Tort Recoveries, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 119,
130 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009).
30. See Nathan P. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on “Heart Balm,” 33 MICH. L. REV.
979, 979 (1935).
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bring litigation against the other.31 Social conservatives, in contrast,
favored the survival and reform of amatory torts.32 However, their
goal was not to reclaim property interests in their wives, as in tradi-
tional patriarchal marriages of the mid-eighteenth century.33 Rather,
consistent with the idea of marriage for love, social conservatives
favored a male breadwinner/full-time housewife marriage.34 In em-
bracing a romantic paternalist ideology, social conservatives aimed
to modernize amatory torts as a tool to protect family honor and re-
establish the traditional function of marriage in society.35
In light of the historical evolution of interspousal immunities
and amatory torts, Part II examines how tort scholars have shaped
intimate liability in the last fifty years. In particular, they have mar-
ginalized intentional torts and viewed with great skepticism emo-
tional harm arising in intimate relationships.36 Such development
has been explained from two different, but equally important, tort
approaches. From a civil recourse standpoint, John C.P. Goldberg
shows that the predominance of the fault principle has led to the
ascendancy of compensation and deterrence theories in tort law with
the concurrent marginalization of intentional torts.37 From a femi-
nist standpoint, Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins propose
that the gender biases embedded in the tort system have led to the
marginalization of compensation for emotional rather than physical
harm.38 This article, however, offers a third account that relies on
31. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441–42 (“By marriage, the husband
and wife are one person in law: . . .that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman
is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and
is therefore called in our law—french a feme-covert, femina viro co-operta; it is said to be
covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord;
and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture.”).
32. Nicola, supra note 20, at 658.
33. Id.
34. See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY
OR HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 5 (2005) (explaining that marriage had two different
traditional functions: first in the mid-eighteenth century and then in the mid-twentieth
century, and that the shift from one to the other was due to the new and revolutionary idea
that “love should be the central reason for marriage, and companionship its basic goal”).
35. Nicola, supra note 20, at 658.
36. See, e.g., Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 8.
37. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 526–27. Because tort law was conceived as advanc-
ing public ends, negligence became the paradigmatic tort involving corporate plaintiffs and
insurance companies. In contrast, intentional torts received comparatively little scholarly
attention, either because scholars understood them as not being matters of public concern,
or because they became doctrinally uninteresting. See id.
38. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY:
RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 37–38 (2010) (explaining that while emotional harm was as-
sociated with women in domestic settings, physical harm was associated with the action
of males in the workplace).
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the persistent ideological distinction between the family and the mar-
ket in tort law. Scholars have successfully deployed IIED claims to
redress the mental and relational harm suffered by plaintiffs in em-
ployment, debtor-creditor, and landlord-tenant relations.39 In contrast,
they have found family law more suitable to address emotional harm
between spouses or intimate partners.40 In doing so, tort scholars have
pushed intimate liability into family law, rather than tort law.41
Part III articulates how feminists and social conservatives have
stepped into the breach.42 In past decades, by way of defending their
proposed law reforms and litigation outcomes, both groups have used
stereotyped gender roles that reflect the reformer’s goals.43 Feminists
portray the woman as a victim in the home or as a consumer in the
market, whereas social conservatives portray her as a cheater in the
family or as a voracious sexual secretary in the market.44 Insofar as
stereotypes based on heterosexual relationships or “traditional” fam-
ilies inform tort doctrine, they prevent many plaintiffs who have suf-
fered emotional harm in intimate relationships from obtaining relief.
Part IV shows how feminists and social conservatives’ political
motivations for tort reform become clear if we consider what, or who,
is left outside of the current litigation strategies.45 A taxonomy of the
plaintiffs covered by intimate liability litigation—married, divorcing,
and cohabitant couples—shows that the current intimate liability
regime allows only some plaintiffs to recover.46 In practice, cohabi-
tants and same-sex couples, who do not fit the intimate relation-
ships portrayed by political reformers, are prevented from recovering
damages.47 For same-sex partners or cohabitants, it remains almost
impossible to recover damages through intimate liability.
Today, an increasing number of plaintiffs are prevented from
accessing the tort system for ideological reasons created by the
pervasive market/family distinction and for cultural reasons pro-
moted by the stereotyped narratives of feminists and social conser-
vatives in intimate liability. Therefore, many plaintiffs are unlikely
to find redress through tort law and even less likely to do so through
family law. Plaintiffs in heterosexual relationships, such as cohab-
itants who do not conform to traditional visions of the married cou-
ple, fall into this category. In addition, due to the limited number of
39. Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 1281.
40. Id. at 1342–43.
41. Id.
42. See infra Part III.
43. Nicola, supra note 20, at 651.
44. See infra Table 1.
45. See infra Part IV.
46. Nicola, supra note 20, at 651.
47. Id.
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states that recognize same-sex marriages, homosexual couples are
also left out of interspousal tort litigation promoted by feminists and
social conservatives.
In supplementing family law with tort law, or in bringing stand-
alone tort claims for emotional distress, plaintiffs who are left out of
the tort system or who do not fit stereotyped narratives could reclaim
compensation for emotional harm in intimate relations. Intimate
liability could offer relief to plaintiffs in situations that go beyond
marriage and heteronormative relations and in which economic and
emotional dependencies are necessarily intertwined. Compensation
in these cases could provide relief for victims, alleviation of economic
burden, and effective deterrence for their offenders.
I. THE MIXED LEGACY OF INTERSPOUSAL TORTS: BETWEEN
WOMEN’S EMANCIPATION AND THE PROTECTION OF FAMILY HONOR
With the demise of interspousal immunities after World War II,
the expansion of liability in intra-family torts became a symbol of the
victory for women’s rights. The old system of interspousal immunities
prevented a spouse from suing the other in tort actions.48 In particular,
it barred a wife from suing her husband while incorporating the wife
into her husband’s legal personhood.49 Because interspousal immu-
nity was the norm in the nineteenth century, intra-family, or domestic,
torts were a relatively new development.50 The rise of intra-family
torts became part of the women’s narrative of emancipation, granting
them access to political and civil rights, and marking their increasing
legal capacity to own property, sign contracts, and sue in tort.51
Women could now enjoy protection and compensation from the
tort system against the emotional abuses of men.52 This develop-
ment happened at the expense of what was considered oppressive
family solidarity in which women were subordinate to men.53 By the
1980s, feminist scholars, who had grown skeptical about the economic
benefits of the new divorce legislation for women, approached intra-
family torts as a remedy for the economic disparities that women
were subject to in the aftermath of a no-fault divorce.54
48. See Salvatore Patti, Intra-Family Torts, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW: PERSONS AND FAMILY 9-1, 9-6 (Aleck Chloros et al. eds., 1998).
49. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *441–42.
50. Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 422 (1989).
51. See Kerry Abrams, A Legal Home: Derivative Domicile and Women’s Citizenship
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
52. See Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Modern Status of Interspousal Tort Immunity in
Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions, 92 A.L.R.3d 901, § 15 (1979 & Supp. 1995).
53. See Tobias, supra note 50, at 471.
54. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 209.
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At the same time, however, interspousal torts litigation became
a remedy selected by social conservatives to curb the plague of divorce
on demand.55 They sought to undermine sexual patterns such as adul-
tery, cohabitation, and premarital sex through interspousal torts.56
Despite the risk of undermining the affective privacy of marital rela-
tionships, conservative reformers envisioned the revival and reform
of the old amatory torts as a way to protect family honor and preserve
the traditional function of marriage in society as the center for inti-
mate and reproductive life.57
A. Women’s Emancipation as the Ability to Sue their Husbands
This Part traces the doctrinal changes driven by feminist advo-
cates to abolish interspousal immunities in order to allow wives to sue
their abusive husbands in tort law. In particular, it addresses the
initial suspicion, and then the increasing interest, of feminist scholars
in using intentional torts to protect women from physical and emo-
tional harm perpetrated by their male partners.58 Despite the reluc-
tance of courts to enter the bedroom, feminists were successful in
deploying the tort of IIED to compensate women for emotional harm
suffered in their relationships.
In addition, the widespread critiques by liberal feminists of the
uneven economic outcomes in divorce for women, whereby ex-wives
would be made poorer than their ex-husbands,59 also created great
expectations for IIED claims. These critics created an expectation that
IIED could become an effective remedy for those women who, having
suffered from their abusive husband’s behavior, were, at the same
time, unfairly impacted economically by a divorce proceeding.60 Inter-
spousal torts became a compensatory device used in a divorce settle-
ment to redress the wrongs perpetrated by husbands against wives.
1. The End of Interspousal Immunities with Exceptions
With the widespread abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal
tort immunity after World War II, many divorcing or divorced spouses
have been asserting tort claims against each other for misconduct that
occurred during the marriage.61 This situation sits in stark contrast
55. Nicola, supra note 20, at 651.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 658.
58. Id. at 654.
59. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 1, at 210–11.
60. Nicola, supra note 20, at 655.
61. See Foster, supra note 52, at 947, 951.
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to the situation at the beginning of the nineteenth century. To under-
stand the notion of interspousal immunities that characterized the
tort regime between husbands and wives, it is necessary to go back to
William Blackstone, the English jurist who published his Commen-
taries on the Law of England in 1765.62 According to Blackstone, the
family was a private sphere separated from the public in which wife
and children obeyed the patriarch.63 This regime, called coverture,
submerged women’s legal identity into that of their husbands.64 The
husband exercised absolute authority over his wife’s property, debts,
and necessities.65
In nineteenth-century American law, the doctrine of interspousal
immunity derived from Blackstone’s conception that husband and wife
formed a single unit.66 For several reasons, this immunity disappeared
over time. One reason was the drive for gender equality and the adop-
tion of the Married Women’s Property Acts and the Emancipation
Acts.67 These Acts reversed coverture, and women were allowed to
control their property and keep their legal identity.68 Another impetus
was the constitutional notion of equal protection under the law.69 As
a result, women acquired the ability to sue in tort law, including the
right to sue their husbands.70
Even though women acquired the right to sue their husbands
in the twentieth century as part of their political and civil emanci-
pation, courts were not always willing to let such cases stand, citing
a desire to preserve the harmony and affective privacy of family
life.71 As a consequence, judges and lawyers interpreted the Married
Women’s Property Acts and Emancipation Acts as maintaining in-
terspousal immunities for tort claims.72 Because intra-family tort
lawsuits were seen as potentially disruptive to the core societal value
62. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *443.
63. Id.; see Olsen, supra note 10, at 1530–31.
64. See Olsen, supra note 10, at 1530–31.
65. Scholars and judges co-opted Blackstone’s ideas into the American legal sphere,
adopting classical legal thought as a model of legal analysis. These scholars rationalized
the market/family distinction through classical legal thought. This allowed scholars to
maintain moral tenets within the family, while simultaneously espousing neutral ideas
for contract, property, and tort law. See Kennedy, supra note 15, at 811, 813; see also
Olsen, supra note 10, at 1498, 1530–31 (stating that the nineteenth century viewpoint
saw women’s home and family sphere as separate and distinct from that of the market
structure with which the husband engaged).
66. See Tobias, supra note 50, at 364–65, 370.
67. Id. at 409.
68. Id. at 409–10.
69. See Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319–20 (Tex. 1987).
70. See Tobias, supra note 50, at 409–10.
71. Id. at 383.
72. Id. at 386–88.
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of family solidarity, especially when children were involved, state
courts varied in when and how they abolished the doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity.73
Today, there are salient differences among state common law
regimes. For example, even though half of the states have completely
abolished interspousal immunity to tortious lawsuits among family
members, other states have imposed limitations on these lawsuits for
different reasons including: limiting the threat to family harmony,
protecting the children, preserving the possibility of fixing a broken
marriage, avoiding frivolous lawsuits, preventing fraud and collusion,
and limiting litigation to negligent torts rather than intentional ones.74
A small number of states still recognize interspousal tort immunities
in their legislation or through the common law.75
Finally, states also differ in terms of when interspousal torts can
be brought. While some states allow interspousal tort suits for torts
that occurred before the marriage, other states allow these lawsuits
during divorce proceedings.76 Still others allow lawsuits for harm that
occurred during the marriage to be brought after the divorce or sepa-
ration agreement has been finalized.77
Because of these procedural differences, and the persistence in
the practice of interspousal immunities strengthened by the wide-
spread argument that tort law could destroy the affective privacy of
the marriage, it is difficult to find a clear geographical pattern among
states with respect to domestic and interspousal torts.78 Despite a
73. This variation occurred in the form of legislation, case law, or other means. See
Elizabeth Katz, Note, How Automobile Accidents Stalled the Development of Interspousal
Liability, 94 VA. L. REV. 1213, 1217 (2008). Katz explains:
[T]he trend allowing interspousal torts was complicated by the emergence and
prevalence of . . . negligent automobile accidents. Unlike the willful torts con-
sidered in the earlier periods, it was obvious in the negligence cases that both
the plaintiff-wife and defendant-husband wished for the wife to recover. The
invisible defendant, truly responsible for paying any awarded damages, was
an insurance company. The resultant concern about insurance fraud and col-
lusion halted judicial willingness to allow interspousal torts. And, because
they saw no legal reason to distinguish between negligent and willful torts,
the courts construed the [M]arried [W]omen’s [A]cts so as to not allow any
interspousal torts.
Id.
74. See Benjamin Shmueli, Tort Litigation Between Spouses: Let’s Meet Somewhere in
the Middle, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195, 215–16 (2010); Tobias, supra note 50, at 441.
75. Louisiana is the only state that maintains full immunity through legislation. LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:291 (2012).
76. See Foster, supra note 52, at § 26, § 30.
77. See Shmueli, supra note 74, at 217.
78. See Carl Tobias, The Imminent Demise of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 60 MONT.
L. REV. 101, 102 (1999) (explaining the difficulty of showing a geographical pattern while
analyzing the differences and similarities between Virginia and Montana).
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great variability and disparity in results across jurisdictions, this
article shows that the majority of cases redressing emotional harm
arise in the context of marital breakdown. In contrast, only a handful
of cases, most likely unsuccessful for the plaintiffs, occur between
non-married couples, cohabitants, or same-sex couples.79
2. Using IIED Torts to Recover for Women’s Emotional Harm
After World War II, advocates believed that social injustices
could be rectified through emotional torts. Two drafters of the Second
Restatement of Torts, William Prosser and Judge Calvert Magruder,
included IIED specifically to redress “extreme and outrageous” con-
duct that caused psychological damage without physical contact.80
In the United States, the increasing use of intentional torts and,
in particular, the IIED doctrine, has recently given rise to some impor-
tant cases sanctioning physical and emotional abuse between spouses.
The increasing number of cases recognizing interspousal torts demon-
strates the creative argumentation used by advocates aiming to shape
intimate liability.81 Despite the conflicting ideological goals among
advocates, it is possible to see a common aim, namely reinstating
fault in interspousal disputes.
a. Feminist Strategies with IIED
For many feminist scholars, the history of IIED as a new digni-
tary tort had problematic gender implications. In fact, the early IIED
cases were primarily concerned with the protection of “ ‘respectable
women’ against conduct that threatened their reputation for sexual
propriety.” 82 Martha Chamallas articulates that, “this ‘dignitary tort’
was used in the past to ‘reinscribe traditional gender ideologies and to
reinforce race segregation and white racial privilege.’ . . . [T]he precur-
sors of IIED were dignitary claims generally used in gender-saturated
contexts so that the tort reflected dominant cultural conceptions of
‘male honor’ and ‘female chastity.’ ” 83
79. See infra Part III (explaining the doctrinal complexity and the outcomes of inter-
spousal tort litigation).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1), § 71 (1965) (“One who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another
is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results
from it, for such bodily harm.”).
81. Such expansion happened by means of a limited number of tort doctrines including:
IIED, negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), consent, and battery.
82. Chamallas, supra note 29, at 122.
83. Nicola, supra note 20, at 653 (quoting Chamallas, supra note 29, at 122).
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Chamallas describes the transformation of IIED tort law. In
doing so, Chamallas shows that the evolving cultural status of men,
women, and the family has coincided with the changing way in which
IIED torts are used.84 For example, “[i]n the late 1970s, when new
gender ideologies—radical and cultural feminism—made their way
into the American consciousness, feminist legal scholars tried to par-
lay the cultural revolution into a legal one.” 85 Attaining women’s
equality, to feminist advocates, meant promoting “rights-based ap-
proaches” that safeguarded a women’s freedom of choice in both
public and private settings.86
Catharine A. MacKinnon was at the forefront of this movement.
However, MacKinnon was doubtful that tort law could be reformed
because she believed that the legal community worked to “protect
liberal patriarchy” and, thus, would resist any attempt to augment
liability in interspousal or sexual torts.87 MacKinnon argued that
patriarchy “pervades society through modes of male domination in
the family and the workplace that go beyond coercion and violence and
contributes to the creation of human knowledge with a conscious-
ness of male domination.” 88 This “consciousness,” imbued in judges
and lawyers, influences the outcomes and determinations of IIED
claims brought against emotionally abusive husbands by their wives.89
By the 1990s, however, scholars began to challenge the notion
that tort law could not serve a feminist agenda.90 They explained
that avoiding tort law only served to ostracize sexual discrimination
claims from core law school curriculum (that is, through common
contract, tort, and property claims).91 These feminist advocates also
pushed for tort solutions to domestic violence.92 This movement helped
84. Chamallas, supra note 29, at 122.
85. Nicola, supra note 20, at 654.
86. Id.
87. Id. (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrim-
ination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 36–38 (1987)).
88. Id. The central theme of MacKinnon’s theory is that liberal patriarchy not only de-
scribes men’s domination over women, but also promotes the idea that men’s “objective”
knowledge is epistemologically perfect in contrast to women’s “subjective” knowledge.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 537–38 (1982). In her estimation, feminism thus requires not only
a subversion of those institutional structures that maintain male domination over women,
but also, more radically, a new production of knowledge no longer affected by exclusive
male control over objectivity. Id.
89. See Chamallas, supra note 29, at 130–31.
90. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL
L. REV. 575, 575 (1993).
91. See id. at 589–90 (giving examples of how scholars sought to integrate sexual dis-
crimination into tort classes).
92. See Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts as if Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA.
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 115, 145 (1994).
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create IIED tort remedies for sex-based domestic violence and work-
place discrimination.93
Throughout the 1990s, feminists continued to use tort liability
to report and deter violent male spouses. For example, Elizabeth
Schneider promoted the theory of battered women as survivors, not
simply victims, to encourage judges to appreciate the varied experi-
ences and circumstances of women exposed to domestic violence.94
Clare Dalton demonstrated that affective privacy and “family har-
mony” rationales were still pervasive in courtrooms, a vestige of his-
torical interspousal tort immunity.95 This reality created barriers for
women bringing IIED claims, even though interspousal tort immu-
nity had been all but eliminated at this time.96 As the following sec-
tions will show, judges use a variety of arguments and justifications
to limit the ability of abused women to bring IIED claims.
b. “Affective Privacy” Arguments Against the Expansion
of Interspousal Torts
As previously discussed, the elimination of interspousal immu-
nities did not necessarily correspond to an increase in successful IIED
tort claims.97 For example, in Hakkila v. Hakkila, the New Mexico
Appeals Court limited such claims by adopting stricter definitions
of “outrageous behavior.” 98 The court deemed that a husband’s be-
havior was not “outrageous” enough to rule in favor of an IIED claim,
93. See id. at 144–47.
94. See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 17
(2001); see also Heather Lauren Hughes, Contradictions, Open Secrets and Feminist
Faith in Enlightenment, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 187, 188–89 (2002). Battered Woman
Syndrome (BWS) is a medical condition recognized in both tort and criminal law which
allowed feminists to extend the statutes of limitations for claims arising from abusive
relationships. Dalton, supra note 3, at 344–45. Because it can take a long time before
women denounce the abusive relationship during or after a marriage, those time limi-
tations made it difficult for women to state their claims or to recover for the entire
measure of their injuries. In response, feminist lawyers presented the abusive behavior
by the husband as a “continuing tort, and a cumulative injury, so that statutes of limi-
tation begin to run only when the abuse stops, which will be when the partners separate,
unless the abuser continues to terrorize his partner, either to punish her, or in the hopes
of bringing her back into the relationship.” Id. at 358. Several states’ supreme courts have
adopted this approach, and women have been successfully awarded high damages in cases
in which the husbands maintained outrageous and abusive behaviors towards their wives,
who suffered emotional and psychological harm. See, e.g., Curtis v. Firth, 850 P.2d 749, 756
(Idaho 1993).
95. Dalton, supra note 3, at 329.
96. See id. at 321.
97. See MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS
218 (8th ed. 2006) (explaining that courts often barred tort actions between spouses, thus
restricting the claim of IIED between married partners).
98. 812 P.2d 1320, 1325–26 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
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despite the fact that he insulted his wife in the presence of friends,
yelled at her, “lock[ed] her out of house in the winter when she was
wearing nothing but a robe, telling her she was insane, refus[ed] to
let her pursue schooling and hobbies, and blame[d] the wife’s sexual-
ity for his inadequacies in the bedroom.” 99 The court cited the Second
Restatement of Torts in support of its decision, opining that:
The intimacy of the family relationship may . . . involve some
relaxation in the application of the concept of reasonable care,
particularly in the confines of the home. Thus, if one spouse in
undressing leaves shoes out where the other stumbles over them
in the dark, or if one spouse spills coffee on the other while they
are both still sleepy, this may well be treated as not negligence.100
The Hakkila court thus relaxed the bar for outrageous conduct when
it came to domestic matters by reasoning that judges should not
inquire too harshly into torts that occur within the private zone of
the home.101
The court did not downplay the importance of the new tort of
IIED, but it also wished to limit causes of action that would open
the doors of the court to an overwhelming number of cases dealing
with family matters that ought not be litigated in the first place.102
To illustrate this, the Hakkila court cited Judge Calvert Magruder:
“[I]t would be unfortunate if the law closed all the safety valves
through which irascible tempers might legally blow off steam.”103
This fear of a flood of IIED claims that would severely limit human
actions that are typically chalked up to “irascible tempers” was a con-
cern of both Prosser and Magruder who removed any behavior that
was not “extreme and outrageous” from the realm of IIED torts.104
The Hakkila court noted that “[c]ourts must recognize that we are
not yet as civilized as we might wish” and refused to sustain the
IIED claim against the husband.105
The Hakkila court and others in the legal world worry that
“because of pervasive incivility in our society, judicial resources would
be taxed if a cause of action were permitted for every intentional
infliction of emotional distress.”106 By limiting the IIED claim and
99. Nicola, supra note 20, at 655 (summarizing the facts of Hakkila, 812 P.2d at 1322).
100. Hakkila, 812 P.2d at 1323 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. h
(1965)).
101. Id. at 1326.
102. Id. at 1325.
103. Id. at 1324 (quoting Calvin Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the
Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1053 (1936)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Hakkila, 812 P.2d at 1324.
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holding that Arthur Hakkila’s behavior was not “extreme and out-
rageous” but merely the product of a bad temper, the Hakkila court
sought to discourage litigation propagated by angry wives who wanted
revenge on their divorcing husbands.107
We can look to other cases for examples of behavior that are
indeed considered “outrageous.” Generally, “within the context of
intimate relationships, it seems, behavior is outrageous only if it in-
volves physical and objective violence like rape, assault, and destruc-
tion of property, rather than emotional and subjective accusations
of [harm].”108 In order to recover from a husband who psychologically
and verbally abuses her, a wife must satisfy an even higher standard.
In these cases, “judges and juries tend to conclude that the ‘out-
rageous’ standard had been met only when they are confronted with
forms of sexual behavior that they consider immoral, indecent, or
extreme.”109 Unless sadomasochistic sex or what societal morality
would label as perverse sexual patterns is at issue, the problem for
feminist lawyers is that emotionally or psychologically abusive be-
havior is unlikely to become the object of judicial scrutiny under the
outrageousness standard.
3. A Remedy to Compensate Women for the Unfair
Consequences of Divorce
Feminist scholars have shown the uneven economic effects of
the marital breakdown on men and women and criticized the unfair
economic consequences of divorce for women. The hope that inter-
spousal torts could rebalance economic disparities created by divorce
settlements became a reason for reintroducing emotional harm claims
during divorce proceedings.110 Tortious causes of action still allow
for sizeable damage awards in some states, such as North Carolina,
while in others, such as Connecticut, lawyers have strategically used
107. Id. at 1327.
108. Nicola, supra note 20, at 656; see, e.g., Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1137,
1137 n.1 (Me. 1993) (finding that threats of harm, including the threat to “burn down
the inn [where she was staying],” sufficed to meet the “outrageous conduct” standard for
IIED torts).
109. Nicola, supra note 20, at 656 (citation omitted); see Massey v. Massey, 867 S.W.2d
766, 767 (Tex. 1993). The use of a subjective, rather than objective, standard taints the
decisions of juries because it allows for the expression of class and racial biases, so much
so that scholars have argued that IIED suits should be limited to cases in which the
“outrageous” conduct is also criminally sanctioned for battery or assault. For an analysis
of the Massey case, see Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 1317–24.
110. See, e.g., Havell v. Islam, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449, 454 (App. Div. 2002) (affirming the
trial court’s decision to grant wife a larger portion of the marital property due to an inter-
personal tort).
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interspousal torts as a second chance to reassign the distribution of
property, irrespective of the divorce settlement.111
By the mid-nineteenth century, most states had repealed legis-
lative divorce and implemented judicial divorce in its place, with some
states, such as Massachusetts, providing for judicial divorce as early
as the 1780s.112 However, there still existed no such thing as consen-
sual divorce because divorce was conceived as “a privilege granted
to an innocent spouse,” namely the person who possessed sufficient
grounds for dissolving the marital union.113 Regardless, divorces con-
tinued to occur, and the increasing availability of divorce reflected the
balance struck between two irreconcilable social demands: protect-
ing the sanctity and stability of marriage on one hand and accom-
modating the social reality of the need for mechanisms to terminate
marriages on the other.114 Max Rheinstein called the result of these
conflicting demands a “democratic compromise” that “resulted in the
satisfaction of almost everyone concerned.”115
Despite the growing demand for divorce, the common acceptable
grounds for divorce remained adultery, desertion, fraud, impotence,
cruelty, conviction of a felony, and habitual drunkenness.116 Although
the demand for an easily obtainable divorce continued to grow,117 the
process was never simplified because of the influence of those oppos-
ing the accessibility of divorce.118 The increasing demand for divorce
was attributed to changes in the institution of marriage, which was
no longer a legally sanctioned “indentured servitude,” but came to
symbolize an ideal companionship entailing heightened expectations
of affection and partnership.119 As Lawrence M. Friedman eloquently
explained, by the 1870s, a gap existed between the divorce law on the
books and divorce allowed in practice.120 According to Friedman, per
111. See Gyerko v. Gyerko, No. CV095025827S, 2009 WL 2357968 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 7, 2009); see also Interview with Robert A. Solomon, Clinical Professor Emeritus of
Law, Yale Law Sch. (Mar. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Solomon Interview].
112. Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective,
63 OR. L. REV. 649, 652 (1984).
113. Id. at 653.
114. Id.
115. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN
FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 66 (1987) [hereinafter GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE] (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STA-
BILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 258 (1972)).
116. Friedman, supra note 112, at 653–54.
117. Id. at 657.
118. Id. at 656.
119. See June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology,
Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 961–62 (1991); Friedman,
supra note 112, at 657–58.
120. See Friedman, supra note 112, at 659.
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se no-fault divorce did not exist.121 There existed only consensual
“fault” divorces in which couples colluded to fabricate proof of adultery
to satisfy strict divorce laws.122 In jurisdictions where grounds were
less strict and allowed for divorce on the grounds of “abandonment”
or “cruelty,” for example, divorce cases usually went uncontested so
that “proof” was not required.123 Even though in practice people were
obtaining consensual divorce through collusion and perjury, the strict
requirements for divorce persisted.124 They reflected a compromise
between the two irreconcilable demands of allowing people to pursue
individual happiness and preserving marital unity as conjugal peace
at any cost.125
The transition to no-fault divorce in the United States was led by
California, which passed a no-fault divorce law in 1970.126 Within a
decade, all but two states, Illinois and South Dakota, had also en-
acted no-fault divorce laws.127 Given that consensual divorce had been
available in practice for over a century, the advent of no-fault divorce
finally closed the gap between reality and social ideals.128 Further,
the waiting period for a unilateral divorce without fault in a United
States mixed-grounds jurisdiction, where both fault and no-fault
regimes for terminating divorce were in place, was a year or less.129
Often, the result of eliminating fault-based divorce was that
wives could recover smaller amounts in no-fault actions, because a
husband’s “fault” was no longer relevant to the calculation of prop-
erty division or alimony.130 Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, courts had broad discretion to redistribute all of the spouses’ prop-
erty in a way that seemed fair to the judge.131 Upon divorce, dependent
spouses were often given transitional awards intended to encourage
their financial independence, but the women were often left in a worse
financial state than they had been before they married.132 After the
advent of no-fault divorce, women had less assurance that their mar-
riages would last or that they would receive financial protection if
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 660.
124. Id. at 662.
125. Id. at 663.
126. Friedman, supra note 112, at 667.
127. Id. at 664.
128. Id.
129. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 189 (1989) [hereinafter GLENDON,
STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY].
130. Id. at 190–91.
131. See id. at 227.
132. Carbone & Brinig, supra note 119, at 979.
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these ultimately failed. As a result, women began to view their eco-
nomic contribution to marriages as more essential,133 fostering the
ideology of “liberal feminism.”134
Likewise, cultural feminists135 have argued for the reintroduction
of fault-based divorce because they believe that, even assuming total
economic equality, gender-based differences in mortality, and the na-
ture of sexual attraction will ensure that men have greater incentives
than women to breach marital obligations.136 Additionally, cultural
feminists suggest that “women would have less of an incentive to
enter into marriage if they could not enforce marital commitments.”137
Further, cultural feminists oppose laws that penalize women’s choices
to forego economic opportunities for domestic duties such as child-
rearing,138 and they argue that demanding women’s self-support is
unrealistic in cases where minor children are present and where one
spouse has devoted years to raising children.139 These advocates
wish to restore traditional fault-based schemes that often afforded
at least some economic protection to a dependent wife and children
upon divorce.140 Finally, cultural feminists also find the abolition of
fault-based divorce problematic because it eliminates the clear prin-
ciples that could serve as a background for negotiating a fairer divi-
sion of property.141
In contrast, liberal feminists have argued that while fault served
to discourage men from leaving marriages, it also left women with
little bargaining power within their relationships.142 The liberal fem-
inist view is reflected in a decline of the patriarchal belief “that the
husband is responsible for the financial well-being of his family” and
in the simultaneous increase in the belief that economic obligations
133. Id. at 980.
134. “Liberal feminism” for the purposes of this article refers to “a view that women
and men are, for all legitimate purposes, the same; equality is [liberal feminism’s] central
social and legal goal. . . . [L]iberal feminism has veered from equal treatment to special
treatment; from formal equality to substantive equality; from empty theories of gender
to particularized ones.” JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK
FROM FEMINISM 79 (2006).
135. “Cultural feminism” for the purposes of this article refers to the view that “women
have a distinct consciousness and/or culture. . . . [that] derives from their biological situ-
ation . . . [or] emerges from their historical oppression by men. Some versions . . . . take
both ‘essentialist’ forms (women are naturally maternal) and ‘social constructionist’ ones
(men made women do all the mothering).” Id. at 58–59.
136. Carbone & Brinig, supra note 119, at 991–92.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 996.
139. GLENDON, STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY, supra note 129, at 235.
140. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra note 115, at 81–82.
141. Id. at 86.
142. Carbone & Brinig, supra note 119, at 997–98.
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within marriage and divorce are shared responsibilities and that the
basic equality of men and women should restrain women’s claims
following the advent of no-fault divorce.143
Scholars such as Martha Albertson Fineman have articulated
the shortcomings of the liberal feminist notion that “rule-equality”
(sameness of treatment under the law for women and men) is the best
way to ensure equitable results for men and women upon divorce.144
Fineman points out that, in the two decades following the emergence
of economic reforms in divorce law that promote “rule-equality,” there
has been no evidence that, in the majority of cases, the economic con-
dition of divorced women has improved.145 Indeed, there is evidence
suggesting that the situation is worsening for middle-class and pro-
fessional women who add full-time work to their childcare duties.146
For example, studies indicate that “noncustodial parents [(usually
men)] typically enjoy higher standard of living than that of the cus-
todial parent [(usually women)] and dependent children.”147
In 1990, Deborah L. Rhode and Martha Minow highlighted that
the frequency and duration of spousal support had declined over the
prior two decades, so that only about one-sixth of divorced women re-
ceived maintenance, and about two-thirds of those spouses received
support only for a limited duration.148 Even for that limited group, to
whom maintenance was technically granted, amounts were usually
modest, and only about half actually received full payment.149 Rhode
and Minow argued that the legal issues surrounding divorce had been
conceived too narrowly and were treated as “private” matters that ig-
nored the link between the private realms of family life and the public
realms of the state and market.150
The effect of relegating divorce to a purely private sphere meant
the shielding of private relations from public oversight and a conse-
quent inability to punish or address marital rape, spousal or child
abuse, or to enforce child support obligations.151 Rhode and Minow in-
sisted that laissez-faire family law policies were not gender neutral,152
and the assumption of a private/public distinction not only led to the
143. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 38 (1991).
144. See id. at 36.
145. See id. at 37.
146. See id.
147. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE, supra note 115, at 86.
148. Rhode & Minow, supra note 19, at 201–02.
149. See id. at 202.
150. See id. at 191.
151. See id. at 192.
152. See id.
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undervaluation of women’s nonmonetary contributions in the home,
but also to the dismissal of gender implications for market practices.153
Women’s disproportionate assumption of domestic responsibilities—
including domestic work, as well as marketplace disruptions stemming
from childbirth, child-rearing, and accommodation of the family’s pri-
mary wage earner–limited their ability to pursue opportunities in
the public realm, and divorcing wives needed compensation for the
resulting losses.154 Rhode and Minow explained that early no-fault
reforms failed to consider the concerns of particularly vulnerable
groups, such as those with limited savings or employment options.155
According to them, early divorce reforms tended to exacerbate rather
than eliminate gender inequalities, as illustrated by the sharp de-
cline in single women’s standard of living and a rise in that of men
following divorce.156
The objectives of no-fault divorce, according to these feminist
scholars, were merely to reduce expense, acrimony, and fraud in
resolving matters considered primarily private concerns, not to
ameliorate the post-divorce condition of women.157 Thus, no-fault
divorce simply coincided with the women’s rights movement, and
its proponents were generally not seeking to further women’s posi-
tion; rather, the greater concern was shielding ex-husbands from the
“crippling” and “excessive” burdens created by alimony and child sup-
port payments to ex-spouses and children.158 The result of the no-
fault movement was divorce law that called for “equitable” division of
assets—equality in form, but not in fact.159
Feminist scholars, who depicted women as being at a significant
disadvantage both emotionally and economically after a divorce, sup-
ported the need to find new legal actions to redress this injustice.160
However, some courts have rejected IIED claims because under res
judicata they could allege that the facts in later tort claims were the
same as the ones in the divorce case.161 Other courts have compen-
sated wives for their husband’s abusive behavior through a distri-
bution of assets in the divorce proceeds that favors the wife at the
153. See id. at 193.
154. See Rhode & Minow, supra note 19, at 193.
155. See id. at 196.
156. See id. at 197 (explaining that no-fault initiatives also omitted criteria for assess-
ing the outcomes of divorce on children, subsequent marriages, stepfamilies, and public
welfare responsibilities).
157. See id. at 195.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Rhode & Minow, supra note 19, at 194.
161. See Andrew Schepard, Divorce, Interspousal Torts, and Res Judicata, 24 FAM. L.
Q. 127, 142 (1990).
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expense of the husband.162 These strategies, to secure economic com-
pensation from husbands or ex-husbands, are controlled by a wide
variation in procedure in each state depending on the different stat-
utes of limitations and the possibility of bringing interspousal tort
claims during, after, or before divorce proceedings.163
B. The Changing Meaning of Amatory Torts: From Coverture to
Romantic Paternalism
Since the nineteenth century, amatory torts functioned to protect
not only the honor and property of husbands whose wives, because of
their gentler nature, had been fraudulently seduced, but also the rep-
utation of women who, after an affair, were stigmatized by society.164
Despite the demise of amatory torts by the mid-twentieth century,
social conservatives have used these torts, either in their heart balm
form or through the use of IIED.165 In advocating for the expansion
of interspousal torts, social conservatives have relied on a romantic,
paternalist ideology geared to reinforcing traditional gender roles
within marriage and protecting the honor of the family from adultery
scandals. Yet the meaning of family honor, which is distinct from that
of family harmony, has changed somewhat. Contemporary torts pro-
tect the honor of men or women who have behaved according to moral
and religious precepts, and shame adulterers and their lovers, who
have not.
1. Heart Balm Torts
Over the last 100 years, players in the United States legal system
have altered the way we currently define tort liability and the means
by which damages are calculated in an action between spouses.166
Nevertheless, some social conservatives still hold a position that is
more aligned with nineteenth-century romantic, paternalist ideology,
which classified women as the gentler, more altruistic, and more
family-oriented sex.167 By relying on romantic paternalism, women
162. See Havell v. Islam, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449, 454 (App. Div. 2002). In this case, the court
affirmed a judgment of a lower court which awarded 95.5 percent of marital assets to a
wife as “equitable distribution” in a divorce case where the wife was badly abused by the
husband. This award is especially interesting in light of what seems to be New York’s
particularly high threshold for a finding of IIED.
163. See Solomon Interview, supra note 111.
164. Nicola, supra note 20, at 658–59.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Deana A. Pollard, Sex Torts, 91 MINN. L. REV. 769, 788 (2007).
167. See Berger, supra note 23, at 452–53.
468 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 19:445
received certain unique protections from the law but were also en-
titled to fewer benefits.168
Since then, there have been different amatory torts that pro-
scribed sexual misconduct, thus reinstating the honor and chivalry
of the husband and his exclusive property rights in his wife. “Heart
balms,” or amatory torts, protected virtuous women’s intrinsic value
and the property rights of their fathers or husbands by preventing
other men from having any sexual interaction with these women.169
“Criminal conversation” and “alienation of affection” torts still exist
today in a few states and are the best-known amatory torts.170 Crim-
inal conversation, which is an action against a third party who has
had an adulterous relationship with the plaintiff’s spouse, is a strict
liability tort and in general does not have a defense.171 The tort of
alienation of affection “occurs when a third party’s interference [in
a relationship] destroys the affection that existed between spouses
prior to interference.”172
Amatory torts were often paired with criminal actions. For in-
stance, the seduction statute was a criminal one with civil repercus-
sions.173 As Lawrence Friedman puts it, this mix of criminal and tort
doctrines protected and incentivized women to be “chaste or virtuous,”
as virgins who could be seduced only by their husbands.174 In the late
nineteenth century, despite strict control over sexual behavior, crim-
inal norms became more relaxed, and tort actions such as criminal
conversation changed their social meaning.175 Rather than protecting
the property of the husbands, they were geared toward protecting
168. See SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: MILESTONES TO EQUALITY
1 (Clare Cushman ed., 2d ed. 2001).
169. “Heart balm” refers to a number of tort actions that protected women from broken
hearts through legal actions such as seduction, or breach of marriage promise, allowing
women to sue in their own name for the social injury that women suffered by being com-
promised before marriage by premarital sex or unwed motherhood. See Pollard, supra note
166, at 788–89; see also Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My
Good Nature ‘Deceit’ ”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1993)
(explaining the tort of seduction and its former role as a method of condemning male sexual
aggression). Two additional types of heart balms—criminal conversation and alienation of
affection—were designed to punish a third party by allowing the cheated husbands to sue
the wife’s paramour. See Jones, supra note 20, at 68.
170. Pollard, supra note 166, at 792.
171. See Jones, supra note 20, at 67.
172. Nicola, supra note 20, at 663 (citing Pollard, supra note 166, at 788–89, n.110).
173. E.g., Sacks, supra note 16, at 1058.
174. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 102 (2007).
175. See id. at 104 (The “Victorian compromise” recognized “that not all chaste women
were immune from seduction, that some middle-class women, like some middle-class men,
were capable of sin. The seduction laws were one way to protect these women and give
them a second chance.”).
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“middle-class honor and respectability” by showing that women, just
like men, could be seduced and make regrettable mistakes.176
The mid-twentieth century witnessed the rise of liberal ideas re-
garding sexual freedom, leading to widespread criticism of amatory
torts.177 By the time of the New Deal, the predominant idea among
liberals was that the decision to engage in sex was a matter of per-
sonal choice equally acceptable for men and women. According to
scholar Jane E. Larson, “a new generation of female reformers came
to equate the seduction action with antiquated sexual values threat-
ening to the interests of emancipated women and men.”178 From their
perspective, judges should stay out of the bedroom and avoid pontifi-
cating on morality in their opinions. Furthermore, amatory torts had
come to be seen as corrupt. Heart balms were often used for nefarious
purposes when women were paid to seduce married men in order to
cause a divorce or to extort a settlement.179 Basically, “a sexually ac-
tive woman could exploit conventional morality for her own profit.”180
Critics of heart balm torts argued that, even when the claims were
made in good faith, they harmed more than helped their victims.
Amatory actions caused family disgrace, and damages would not
restore the woman’s virginity.181
As a result of these critiques, most states abolished amatory
torts by the 1980s. Yet, some states still maintain actions for crimi-
nal conversation involving an adulterous relation outside the mar-
riage and have extended the action to wives.182 Most states have also
abolished the tort of alienation of affection, in which lovers were sued
for driving a wedge between family members, as well as the action
for seduction or breach of a promise to marry.183
With the decline of amatory torts, courts began to recognize dif-
ferent intentional tort actions within the family involving the inten-
tional interference with marital bonds.184 By the 1990s, even though
176. See id. at 120 (“They did protect middle-class honor and respectability. They did
serve as a shield for women who slipped—by promoting an image of women as chaste but
weak, as easily seduced, or as cheated out of their innocence.”).
177. Id. at 197.
178. See Larson, supra note 169, at 393.
179. See Friedman, supra note 112, at 652.
180. See Larson, supra note 169, at 395.
181. See William M. Kelly, Note, The Case for Retention of Causes of Action for Inten-
tional Interference with the Marital Relationship, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 426, 427–29
(1972) (discussing the common-law development of familial torts); Nehal A. Patel, Note, The
State’s Perpetual Protection of Adultery: Examining Koestler v. Pollard and Wisconsin’s
Faded Adultery Torts, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1013, 1024 (2003).
182. See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 97, at 920.
183. See id. at 921.
184. Id. at 920.
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procedurally distinct from heart balms, tort actions based on IIED
claims were, in substance, very similar to the barred amatory torts.
2. The Revival of Amatory Torts by Social Conservatives
In the last thirty years, to compensate for the loss of the tradi-
tional amatory torts, social conservatives have turned their attention
to IIED, and, like feminists, they have advocated for an expansion of
intimate liability.185 They have done so, however, for a different pur-
pose: to defend the honor of the family and reinstate traditional sexual
behaviors in marriage.186 Unable to stop the abolition of amatory torts
across jurisdictions, these advocates suggest that wronged plaintiffs
should have the right to bring adultery-based IIED claims against
their unfaithful spouse or third parties.187 According to them, the use
of IIED-based claims against an unfaithful spouse or the unfaithful
spouse’s lover would not only preserve the marital relationship, but
also protect children by ensuring the survival of their parents’ mar-
riage and by promoting moral behavior in family life.188
By reviving the potential for tort liability between spouses, social
conservatives aim to reinforce the institution of marriage, which, in
their view, has been undermined by the adoption of no-fault divorce
by the majority of U.S. states.189 “Tort reform” thus takes on a new
meaning as some social conservatives attempt to expand tort liability
to reverse what they now see as legally sanctioned adultery,190 and
they try to cement the heteronormative matrix of marriage as cen-
trally a procreative endeavor between men and women only.191
Unless they are in a jurisdiction that has not completely abol-
ished amatory torts,192 social conservatives are trying to put ama-
tory torts for sexual misconduct between husband and wife through
adultery-based IIED claims back in the courtroom.193 Their main
objective is the preservation of traditional marriage, which they be-
lieve has been threatened by the introduction of no-fault divorce in the
185. See, e.g., Sacks, supra note 16, at 1071.
186. See Patel, supra note 181, at 1014.
187. Some state courts presented with such cases have already refused to hear them
precisely because such claims are intended as substitutes for the abolished amatory torts.
See id. at 1028.
188. See Berger, supra note 23, at 525–26.
189. E.g., Friedman, supra note 112, at 659–60.
190. See Brenda Cossman, A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender
Equality, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 303, 376 (1990).
191. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex
Couples and the Rhetoric of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 1 (2009).
192. See Table 2, infra Part IV.A.
193. See, e.g., Patel, supra note 181, at 1028.
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1960s, and, more recently, same-sex marriage.194 No-fault divorce in
particular was intended to curtail hostility between divorcing spouses
who would be forced to make accusations of misbehavior against each
other in order to legally obtain a divorce under a different regime.195
Social conservatives contend that instead of addressing emo-
tional hostility, no-fault divorces actually trivialized marriage and,
when anyone could obtain a divorce, resulted in a dramatic increase
in the divorce rate.196 Amatory torts converted into IIED claims should
prevent the dissolution of marriage and reinstate the family honor
in contemporary American society, “which, with almost half of all
marriages ending in divorce . . . , is suffering all the ill effects that
accompany the decline and fall of the traditional nuclear family.”197
By punishing the adulterer or his or her paramour, according to these
advocates, an adultery-based IIED acts as a deterrent that could
strengthen marriage and family life.
Of course, not everyone agrees with social conservatives that the
appropriate remedy to climbing divorce rates is to revitalize amatory
torts. Critics on both the right and left have noted that the elements
of an IIED claim are already litigated as part of a divorce proceeding,
and that to add IIED claims back into the mix would strain judicial
resources.198 Social conservatives counter by arguing that the person
who suffered emotional trauma because a spouse committed adultery
should recover damages irrespective of divorce so that, for example,
a wife could elect to sue for IIED to reinstate the honor of her family
and blame the paramour but not necessarily sue for a divorce.199
Other critics point out that adultery-based IIED claims are essen-
tially the abolished heart balms reintroduced with another name.200
Many courts have avoided awarding merit to IIED-based claims made
against adulterous spouses because they are basically the same as the
outdated claims of alienation of affection or criminal conversation.201
194. See, e.g., Abrams & Brooks, supra note 191, at 3.
195. See, e.g., Patel, supra note 181, at 1047.
196. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the
Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 415, 426–29 (2005).
197. See William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposal to Prevent Adultery and Save
Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 985, 993 (2001).
198. See Tobias, supra note 50, at 464 (explaining that this argument is very common
among courts that have articulated that “women intentionally hurt by their spouses during
marriage can be awarded compensation in the dissolution decree.”).
199. See infra Part III.D (describing the Sexy Secretary stereotype).
200. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress Against Paramours, 99 A.L.R.5th 445, § 3 (2002).
201. See Quinn v. Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330, 337–38 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (declining to
permit an IIED claim by a husband and son against the wife’s paramour because by the
mid-1950s, adultery torts were limited to alienation of affection and criminal conversation
only, which were also later abolished by statute).
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When the legal system does not consider an adulterous affair to be
sufficiently outrageous to support emotional claims, it is indicating
that IIED claims should not be recognized in light of the repeal of
amatory torts. In this way, it is signaling judicial restraint, namely
limiting the court’s role in the tort system.202
3. Protecting Family Honor and Traditional Marriage
The social conservative agenda seeking to expand amatory torts
to preserve family honor derives from a romantic, paternalist ideology
that differs radically from other conservative or liberal positions aim-
ing to protect the family from the intrusion of the state. Family pri-
vacy has become a necessary corollary of family harmony in which the
law should not interfere, or, as Justice Scalia put it, “our traditions
have protected the marital family.” 203 The notion that family privacy,
and consequently its harmony, is threatened by interspousal torts
has been widely used by courts since the beginning of the twentieth
century as a way to push back against the elimination of interspousal
immunities.204 The courts also translated family harmony into affec-
tive privacy, which would be disrupted if litigation were to expose a
couple’s bedroom stories in a public trial.
Because tort law was seen as ill-suited to deal with private and
emotional issues that were raised by interspousal torts, scholars ar-
gued that such matters should be left to criminal law205 or to media-
tion and counseling as a “symptom of a broader family problem.” 206
Even where family harmony is already disputed, scholars and judges
have praised more effective, efficient, and holistic approaches over the
tort system to deal with marital breakdowns that involve separation,
alimony, child custody, and other shared assets.207
Yet, feminists and social conservatives seeking to expand inti-
mate liability challenge the idea that interspousal torts would destroy
a happy marital relationship. Instead, they argue that interspousal
torts would have “little detrimental impact on marital tranquility in
202. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenom-
enology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 522 (1986).
203. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
204. See Tobias, supra note 50, at 448.
205. See Feinsinger, supra note 30, at 992 (“Granted that the social interest in family
solidarity and purity of offspring requires some legal protection, it may suffice to enforce
the existing criminal laws which punish adultery, or, on behalf of the aggrieved spouse, to
invoke the existing divorce laws which nearly everywhere recognize adultery as ground for
dissolution. The inadequacies of these remedies may be conceded, but it is at best doubtful
whether the remedy of damages is any more efficient.”).
206. See Shmueli, supra note 74, at 219.
207. See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 370 (2006).
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numerous circumstances and may protect or even foster peace in some
but will seriously jeopardize harmony in only a few.” 208 Feminists
have argued that women remain oppressed because of their reliance
on marriage to structure social relations,209 so interspousal torts are
not undermining a non-existing and fictional marital harmony. In con-
trast, social conservatives have viewed interspousal torts as a way
to compensate for the loss of reputation and social status of men or
women involved in adultery or sex scandals.210
Traditionally, interspousal torts were used to protect the hus-
band, who could be compensated in a criminal conversation or alien-
ation of affection case against the paramour who dishonored the
husband’s family.211
In the early twentieth century, criminal and civil actions against
seduction were used to protect not only the honor of men, but also
that of women who had to face stigmatizing consequences.212 Social
conservatives committed to amatory torts are seeking to strengthen
the traditional role of marriage in society and shame those who have
undermined family solidarity, while protecting the reputation of those
family members who have respected moral and religious commitments
arising from the marital bond.213
Rather than treating the wife as a husband’s property, contem-
porary interspousal tort claims are supposed to protect the honor of
the husband who has been cheated on by an aggressive and adven-
turous wife, rather than a weak and gentle one. The cheating wife
ought to be punished and the cuckolded husband compensated.214
This change in the social meaning of honor to be protected by inter-
spousal torts has allowed social conservatives to depart from old and
troubling gender conceptions embedded in amatory torts. Instead,
208. See Tobias, supra note 50, at 447.
209. See MICHÈLE BARRETT, WOMEN’S OPPRESSION TODAY: PROBLEMS IN MARXIST
FEMINIST ANALYSIS 195–96 (1980); NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MAR-
RIAGE AND THE NATION 7 (2000); see also Nancy F. Cott, Giving Character to Our Whole
Civil Polity: Marriage and the Public Order in the Late Nineteenth Century, in U.S.
HISTORY AS WOMEN’S HISTORY: NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS 107, 107 (Linda K. Kerber et al.
eds., 1995) (describing how marriage traditionally differentiated the positions of husband
and wife and subsequently compromised the woman’s ability to act for herself in public).
210. See, e.g., Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817,
886, 892 (1996).
211. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 174, at 108.
212. See VanderVelde, supra note 210, at 872. The “sexual connection,” as these inci-
dents were called, had derailed the course of their lives. When the sexual connection be-
came known, these women were disgraced and dishonored, their reputations destroyed,
and their prospects for marriage, which in the nineteenth century were their best hope for
a secure material future, diminished. Single women who were suspected of having had sex,
whether true or not, also found it difficult to find or keep respectable jobs. Id. at 872.
213. Id. at 892.
214. See infra Part III.C (discussing the Cheating Wife stereotype).
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contemporary interspousal torts have successfully introduced roman-
tic love and gender parity by protecting and compensating the faithful
spouse, usually the husband, for the loss of family honor.
II. REDRESSING EMOTIONAL HARM IN THE FAMILY AND THE MARKET
Two important scholarly accounts present compelling explana-
tions for why the evolution of tort law in the twentieth century was
centered on the negligence principle, with the corresponding mar-
ginalization of other tort doctrines, such as intentional torts.
From a corrective justice perspective, tort law should address,
and eventually redress, a moral wrong suffered by individuals, rather
than compensate or deter unsocial behavior at large.215 According to
John C.P. Goldberg, the encompassing negligence approach that was
dominant in the twentieth century has enabled judges, almost like
legislators, to deter unwanted social behavior and compensate victims
through tort law.216 Because of this overwhelming reliance on the fault
principle, tort lawyers have marginalized intentional torts to the pe-
riphery of the discipline.217 In departing from a traditional account
aimed at redressing moral wrongs, contemporary tort scholarship has
mainly focused on negligence as an alternative to strict liability.218
Whereas tort scholars have addressed important social changes, such
as the rise of industrial and automobile accidents through the expan-
sion of negligence and the fault principle,219 intentional torts have
become increasingly marginalized in tort literature.220 By reducing
tort law to compensation and deterrence goals, scholars have made
tort law “synonymous with negligence” whereas intentional torts are
becoming “historical artifacts.” 221
215. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 525.
216. See id. at 526 (arguing that the “removal of arbitrary limits (such as the impact and
zone of danger rules) on claims of negligence causing emotional distress” was part of the
inevitable expansion of the fault principle).
217. Id. at 527 (“Awkwardly, however, the movement started to stall in the 1970s, and
courts thereafter even seemed to lurch backward toward tort’s moralistic past. . . . And,
after flirting with the idea of placing emotional distress under the ambit of the fault prin-
ciple, even the California Supreme Court backtracked to a set of highly formalized rules
limiting the class of plaintiffs who might recover.”).
218. See id. at 516–17 (explaining that the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century
jurists conceptualized the traditional law of torts as a form of redress for those private
wrongs committed by citizens).
219. Id. at 524 (“As the economy and society modernized, objective negligence came to
dominate tort, and tort increasingly took the form of rulings based on judges’ conceptions
of the social desirability or undesirability of particular forms of conduct.”).
220. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 38, at 64 (showing that the marginalization
of intentional harm has reduced intentional torts to “render certain types of recurring
harms largely invisible within the frame of tort law”).
221. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 526.
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Tort scholars were busy explaining how the modern law of neg-
ligence has created coherence in tort liability by purging “arbitrary
limitations,” such as the elimination of interspousal immunities.222
The function of tort law was mainly to compensate welfare losses
and deter socially detrimental behavior resulting in economic and
physical harm.223 In contrast, compensation of emotional distress was
difficult to quantify, and unsocial behavior in the intimate sphere was
difficult to deter.224 Emotional harm and relational injuries, there-
fore, were ranked as lower class injuries.225 These did not squarely
fit a tort agenda that empowered judges to compensate for the losses
created by large-scale accidents and to deter objectively recognized
unsocial behavior.226
From a feminist perspective, tort lawsuits favor men at the ex-
pense of women because they compensate and deter accidents while
ignoring deep gender and racial biases that persist in the deeply en-
trenched physical versus emotional distress distinction.227 Tradition-
ally, compensation for mental and emotional distress was only an
element of the damage resulting from an accident created by a phys-
ical injury to the victim.228 In the 1960s, however, IIED claims ap-
peared, signaling a paradigm shift in tort law, despite the criticism
of plaintiffs recovering for a stand-alone mental or emotional harm.229
According to Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins, when claims
based on emotional distress reached the courts, they encountered doc-
trinal barriers and gender biases that prevented juries from finding
severe emotional distress inflicted by outrageous behavior.230
222. Id. at 527 (“In the view of compensation-deterrence theorists, then, the story of
twentieth-century tort law is the emergence of negligence as the modern tort, as well as
the evolution of that tort toward the pure ‘fault principle,’ a rule of prima facie negligence
liability unadorned by arbitrary limitations.”).
223. Id. at 527.
224. Id. at 528.
225. Id. at 527.
226. See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 97, at ix (representing the typical approach, begin-
ning the tort law course with negligence and marginalizing intentional torts of emotional
harms as ancillary to compensation).
227. See Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36
U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 363 (1984) (explaining the marginalization of emotional distress claims
and the long struggles in tort law to recover for mental distress highlighting the gender
biases in such disparate recovery whereby, traditionally, men holding property could re-
cover for physical harm more than women, who were tasked with the emotional work in
the family); see also Martha Chamallas with Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the
Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 864 (1990) (explaining tort law’s devaluing
of injury associated with women).
228. Bell, supra note 227, at 336.
229. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); Magruder, supra note 103, at
1035–36; William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage,44 CAL. L. REV. 40 (1956).
230. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 38, at 67 (“Rather than being a princi-
pal site for litigation alleging domestic violence and workplace harassment, however,
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In ranking emotional and relational injuries as less important,
tort lawyers have done so at the expense of women.231 Chamallas
and Wriggins explain that, even though tort rules allow some relief
for emotional and relational harm, because this relief mostly con-
cerns women, sex, reproduction, and childbearing, judges often hide
the gender dimension behind doctrinal intricacies.232 In doing so,
they marginalize IIED claims and dismiss important feminist legal
tools to unmask gender biases entrenched in the tort system.233 For
instance, the theory of consent that considers power in all social
situations, or the cultural feminist recognition and valuation of in-
timate relationships, has found little success among judges or juries.234
Finally, feminist scholars have explained that through the tendency
of “steering potential claims of domestic violence into family law,” tort
law has reduced wrongs that could be addressed by the tort system
to family matters.235
This article puts forward a different explanation of why, unloved
by tort lawyers, intentional torts have not become an effective remedy
for addressing emotional harm in intimate relationships. The ideo-
logical divide in legal reasoning between market and family ideals has
contributed to the current skepticism of tort scholars toward intimate
liability.236 As the family is the place where local and particularized
claims are not likely to trigger damages, tort law remains an exclusive
tool to regulate the market. In contrast to wrongs taking place in
the commercial sphere entailing objective, wrongful behavior and at-
large compensatory and deterrence schemes, mental distress happens
within the privacy of the home. This requires an ad hoc analysis to
compensate emotional wrongs that judges see as entrenched in moral-
ity patterns that vary from place to place and ultimately should be
left out of the court system.237
Tort and family law scholars have approached the possibility of
emotional distress claims to compensate spouses for emotional harm
and to deter undesired social behavior in intimate relations with great-
er skepticism. The widespread argument is that the fault principle,
which no-fault divorce has sought to eliminate, should be incorporated
tort  law has played only a marginal role in protecting against these intentionally caused
injuries.”).
231. See id. at 92.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 93.
235. See id. at 69.
236. See Halley & Rittich, supra note 9, at 754–55; Kennedy, supra note 15, at 813;
Fernanda G. Nicola, Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law, 58 AM. J. COMP.
L. 777, 777 (2010).
237. See Halley & Rittich, supra note 9, at 758.
2013] INTIMATE LIABILITY 477
in tort and negligence analyses arising in commercial relations but
left out of family ones.238
Tort scholars have supported IIED claims that arise in market
contexts, rather than family contexts, because of the clear economic
dependency that characterizes relationships in the commercial
realm.239 Due to the difficulty in compensating plaintiffs for emo-
tional harm, especially those emerging in intimate relationships,
these scholars claim that the tort system is ill-suited to address these
wrongs.240 Rather, they have proposed that family law, better suited
to deal with emotions, is more apt to address interspousal litigation.
The family/market divide currently emerging in intimate liability
shows how tort law is another realm in which family law exception-
alism is at work.
A. IIED in the Market
Since the 1950s, courts have increasingly recognized damages for
IIED in a variety of circumstances, allowing debtors to recover from
unfair collection practices and tenants to recover from harassing land-
lords.241 Lawyers have used IIED claims in employment disputes.242
Employees can seek redress for workplace harassment based on IIED,
even though courts have set a high bar for the employer’s acts to con-
stitute outrageous behavior. This can range from criticizing job per-
formance, to using rude, demeaning, and vulgar language, or even to
imposing stressful working conditions and transferring an employee
within a company.243
For instance, in Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co.,244 the court charac-
terized the facts as unusual, and far beyond an ordinary employment
dispute.245 Mr. Wilson, the former vice-president with thirty years’
experience, was demoted to an entry-level position in a warehouse.246
In his job reassignment he was “given the most menial and demeaning
238. See Harry D. Krause, On the Danger of Allowing Marital Fault to Re-Emerge in
the Guise of Torts, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1355, 1363 (1997).
239. Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the
Private Employment Sector, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 157 (2003).
240. Krause, supra note 238, at 1363.
241. See Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547, 547 (Ct. App. 1976),
superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5 (West 2012), as recognized in Lund v.
Merrick, No. G045654, 2012 WL 3635327, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App 2012); Duty v. Gen. Fin.
Co., 273 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex. 1954).
242. Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d. 1138, 1145 (5th Cir. 1991).
243. Cavico, supra note 239, at 116–28.
244. Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1145.
245. Cavico, supra note 239, at 126.
246. Id.
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duties, including janitorial and cleaning duties.” 247 The jury found in
favor of the plaintiff, determining that the employer, who was “unwill-
ing to fire [plaintiff] outright, intentionally and systematically set out
to humiliate him in the hopes he would quit.” 248
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the deci-
sion, stating the employer’s conduct was “degrading and humiliat-
ing, intentional and mean spirited, and a steep downhill push to total
humiliation.” 249 The court concluded that the “conduct was, indeed,
so outrageous that civilized society should not tolerate it.” 250
In Wilson, even though the employee received tort damages for
emotional distress, in most cases the evidentiary bar is set too high
for an employee to prove outrageous behavior.251 There are ways
whereby plaintiffs may obtain compensation for emotional distress
by demonstrating a pattern of continuing abusive behavior, especially
if related to sexual harassment, or if there is a punitive motive behind
the employer’s behavior.
In awarding damages to employees, courts have found that emo-
tional distress is more likely to be inflicted by a manager or supervisor
who exploits his or her position of power in the workplace in an abu-
sive manner.252 Lawyers have justified this reasoning from a social
justice perspective,253 aiming to “provide a viable legal instrument to
counterbalance the inherent inequality of economic bargaining power
in the typical employment relationship.” 254
However, the main difficulty for employees in obtaining damages
for IIED is that this tort has been denied in “ordinary” employment
disputes and even in wrongful terminations of employment.255 Like-
wise, racial and sexual discrimination is not per se a sufficient ele-
ment to meet the “outrageous” standard in the IIED claim.256 In order
to protect employees from workplace abuse, some courts have relaxed
247. Id.
248. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1145).
249. Id. at 126–27 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1145).
250. Id. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson, 939 F.2d at 1145).
251. See, e.g., Heather Adams, Workplace Emotional Distress Claims, N.C.B. ASS’N
(Dec. 17, 2010), http://laborandemploymentlaw.ncbar.org/newsletters/december10lel
/emotionaldistress (explaining that in Daniel v. Carolina Sunrock Corp., 430 S.E.2d 306
(1993), “the evidence was insufficient for extreme and outrageous conduct where other
employees took notes on the plaintiff’s activities, counted and screened plaintiff’s per-
sonal phone calls, inspected the contents of plaintiff’s desk while she attended her father’s
funeral, moved plaintiff to a smaller office with no phone and no heat, and made harassing
phone calls to plaintiff, her sister-in-law, and mother.”).
252. Cavico, supra note 239, at 181.
253. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 560–62 (explaining the social justice theory of using
tort law to rebalance power).
254. Cavico, supra note 239, at 182.
255. Id. at 115.
256. Id. at 123.
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the outrageous standard in situations of obvious economic depend-
ence between the victim and abuser.257 For instance, scholar Frank J.
Cavico has explained that “if the allegedly outrageous and extreme
conduct inflicted on an employee occurs at the workplace and in the
vicinity of one’s fellow employees, the fact that the workplace is in-
volved adds weight to the employee’s outrage claim.” 258
An important application of economic dependence-based reason-
ing is the standard adopted by the Texas Supreme Court, which has
commented that “[i]n the employment context, some courts have
held that a plaintiff’s status as an employee should entitle him to a
greater degree of protection from insult and outrage by a supervisor
with authority over him than if he were a stranger.” 259 However,
courts have gone both ways on this issue. Some courts did not find
that employment-at-will creates an environment prone to mental
abuse; rather, discipline and managerial skills were praised as an
essential part of our capitalist economy.260
Therefore, tort lawyers address emotional harm when it arises
in relationships that are long-term where the employee relies on sell-
ing his/her time in exchange for money. Based on this argument, some
courts have found that employees who are economically dependent
on their jobs are particularly at risk of mental and emotional distress.
Yet, such reasoning was never translated to marital or intimate rela-
tionships characterized by love and affective dependence rather than
labor and economic dependence.
257. Id. at 126–27.
258. Id. at 115.
259. Id. (quoting GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex. 1999)) Other juris-
dictions have also held that an employee is entitled to more protection from IIED. See, e.g.,
Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218 n.2 (Cal. 1970); White v. Monsanto Co., 585
So.2d 1205, 1209–10 (La. 1991); see also Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 335 S.E.2d
445, 448 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that “the existence of a special relationship in which
one person has control over another, as in the employer-employee relationship, may pro-
duce a character of outrageousness that otherwise might not exist.”).
260. See, e.g., Miller v. Galveston/Houston Diocese, 911 S.W.2d 897, 900–01 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1995); Amador v. Tan, 855 S.W.2d 131, 135 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); Horton v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., Inc., 827 S.W.2d 361, 369–70 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (adopting a strict
approach to IIED claims arising in the workplace, stating that “[i]ncidents in which a
Texas court has determined the conduct to be extreme and outrageous in the employer/
employee setting are few.”); see also Sterling v. Upjohn Healthcare Servs., Inc., 772 S.W.2d
329, 330 (Ark. 1989) (“We have taken a strict view of claims for outrage in employment
situations.”). These courts reason that, “to properly manage its business, an employer must
be able to supervise, review, criticize, demote, transfer and discipline employees.” Johnson
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 965 F.2d 31, 34 (5th Cir. 1992); see Sterling, 772 S.W.2d at
330 (showing that, although many of these acts are necessarily unpleasant for the em-
ployee, an employer must have latitude to exercise these rights in a permissible way, even
though emotional distress results); see also Miller, 911 S.W.2d at 901; Diamond Shamrock
Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 809 S.W.2d 514, 522 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part on other grounds, 844 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1992).
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B. Scholars’ Skepticism Toward IIED in the Family
The factors that courts have used to interpret the vague outra-
geous standard of an IIED claim in the employee-employer context
include: the continuous duration of the abuse, the power differential
between the abuser, and the victim and the economic dependency
characterizing the relationship. Yet, in marital or intimate relation-
ships, especially when courts are asked to evaluate IIED claims among
spouses, these factors do not always characterize the courts’ analysis
of the outrageous behavior.261
Some courts have analyzed the outrageous behavior between
spouses in light of their long term commitment through marriage.262
However, the idea that the family entails economic and financial
dependency, in addition to affective dependency, has rarely played
a relevant role in courts’ analysis of emotional distress suffered by a
plaintiff.263 In treating interspousal relations as highly emotional,
governed by love rather than money, judges have shown greater un-
easiness towards these lawsuits.264 In contrast to IIED claims brought
by lawyers in landlord-tenant, employment, or consumer disputes,
judges are more inclined to set aside IIED between spouses by relying
on arguments such as preserving the affective privacy of the marriage
and the risk of frivolous or feigned lawsuits.265
In this vein, the most acclaimed argument, embraced both by
tort and family scholars, has been that the kinds of wrongs litigated
through interspousal torts can be better addressed by divorce pro-
ceedings rather than intentional torts.266 As tort scholar Don B.
Dobbs explains: “Adultery of a spouse is usually painful to the faith-
ful spouse, but if it is painful enough to justify legal intervention,
divorce might be a better solution than a tort action combined with
a continued marriage.” 267
This reasoning reinforces two assumptions. First, family law,
rather than tort law, offers better remedies for the emotional and re-
lational distress inflicted by one spouse upon the other. Second, the
tort system does not operate, through the threat of an IIED claim, as
261. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 758 (2000) (explaining the reluctance of
judges to allow emotional harm factors between spouses because of the emotional nature
of marriage in general).
262. See id.
263. See Whittington v. Whittington, 766 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
adulterous and financially unfair behavior of one spouse towards another is insufficient
to meet the standard of outrageousness).
264. DOBBS, supra note 261, at 758.
265. See Dalton, supra note 3, at 329.
266. DOBBS, supra note 261, at 758.
267. Id.
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another bargaining tool that divorce lawyers have as an additional
resource to obtain benefits for their clients.268
Ira Mark Ellman and Stephen D. Sugarman’s well-known article
Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort? is the most developed doctrinal
and ideological explanation of the skepticism of tort scholars towards
interspousal torts.269 Ellman and Sugarman suggest that courts should
not recognize spousal emotional abuse as a tort, except in cases where
there is also criminal conduct.270 Their article, a collaboration between
a family scholar and a tort scholar, has become part of the canon in
the field of interspousal torts. Not surprisingly, it appears regularly
in both tort and family law casebooks.271
Ellman and Sugarman start from the premise that a trend to-
wards no-fault divorce has been established and ask the reader if, in
light of this evolution, the emerging torts addressing spousal emo-
tional abuse are an “aberration” or if “they suggest a new and im-
proved approach to considering fault in divorce?” 272 The argument is
that emotional harm between spouses should be a family law matter,
a matter that has no direct market implications. In portraying emo-
tional distress as a family law problem (unless it entails a crime), the
authors have internalized what Melissa Murray describes as the de-
criminalization of adultery in family law whereby marriage is the
“lawful site of sexual activity.” 273
In transforming a tortious behavior into a family matter, the
authors rely on another premise about “marital fault.” 274 Originally,
this concept was central to the law of divorce, and today is, according
to the authors, equated to “marital misconduct in traditional tort lan-
guage [so that] recovery of money damages may be possible without
actually revising no-fault divorce statutes.” 275 In doing so, the authors
consciously equate the fault rationale in family law and tort law by
declaring their “prior commitments in both fields to substituting no-
fault principles for fault-based ones.” 276
268. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
269. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 1269–76.
270. See id. at 1337.
271. See, e.g., JUDITH AREEN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATE-
RIALS x (5th ed. 2006); PETER NASH SWISHER ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 461 (3d ed. 2012) (showing that the skeptical approach toward spousal emotional
abuse presented by Ellman and Sugarman dominates casebooks with almost no counter-
view in both tort law and family law).
272. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 1269.
273. See Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal
Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1259 n.18 (2009) (citing AREEN &
REGAN, JR., supra note 271, at 98–109).
274. Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 1270.
275. See id. at 1271.
276. Id. at 1272.
482 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 19:445
The problem, however, is that the authors collapse two different
concepts: marital fault in divorce and the fault created by intentional
and negligent torts for emotional distress between intimate parties.
Each notion of fault or responsibility is based on different doctrines,
evidentiary requirements, trial procedures, and ultimately legal ratio-
nales arising in family or tort law. Although some grounds for fault
might overlap, such as “abusive behavior,” that could be sanctioned
in both fields, family lawyers focus on evaluating the behavior that
has undermined the marital relationship, as opposed to the emotional
harm inflicted upon a person by another individual.277
Even though the authors are aware of the differences between
the dignitary rationale of IIED torts and the promise to respect mar-
ital duties in divorce litigation, they suggest that “[m]ost interspousal
emotional injuries might be understood to arise from the violation of
promises implicit in the marital role.” 278 By making marriage the
central focus of their analysis, Ellman and Sugarman reduce IIEDs
arising in intimate relations to litigations that can be subsumed in
divorce proceedings. As a result, any family relation that is not rec-
ognized by the state and performs a similar affective and economic
function is implicitly absent from their approach.279 In reluctantly
opting against the regime of spousal emotional abuse, the authors’
position also impacts those couples, same-sex or cohabitants, who are
left out of the marriage regime.
Ellman and Sugarman’s justification of the existence of a market/
family distinction in private law works as follows: In asking what
should be the goal of tort law for creating liability in intimate relation-
ships, the authors answer by relying on the dominant compensation
and deterrence theory of tort law. They argue:
The compensation goal of modern tort law is often explained as
serving a useful loss-spreading function, by shifting the plaintiff’s
economic loss onto the defendant’s insurance pool. This purpose
also would not be served in interspousal IIED suits that almost
surely involve uninsured (and probably uninsurable) conduct.
Allowing these suits will not spread losses but will only redistrib-
ute the couple’s wealth. There is ordinarily no “deep pocket” to tap,
unlike interspousal torts for negligent injuries when the couple’s
insurance policy is the target.280
277. Id. at 1271–72.
278. Id. at 1273.
279. See, e.g., ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE
AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY (2009); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND
GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 7–8 (2008); JUDITH STACEY,
UNHITCHED: LOVE, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY VALUES FROM WEST HOLLYWOOD TO WESTERN
CHINA 4–5 (2011).
280. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 1288.
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Having embraced compensation deterrence theory, Ellman
and Sugarman go on making family law exceptionalism claims that
strengthen the idea that tort law is better suited to address emo-
tional harm arising in market, rather than family relations:
This examination of tort law’s deterrence and loss-spreading
goals reveals how different the effects of permitting a tort of
spousal emotional abuse are from the use of IIED claims against
employers, landlords, bill collectors, and the like. Potential tort
liability is far more likely to deter commercial behavior largely
motivated in the first instance by financial incentives than to
stop spousal behavior arising from a far more complex set of
motivations. Additionally, commercial enterprises can spread
their losses even without insurance by raising prices and reduc-
ing investor returns.281
The authors’ reasoning leads us to assume that emotional harm
arising in domestic settings is better addressed by family law instead
of tort law. In relying on the predominant compensation and deter-
rence theory of tort law, they argue that emotionally abusive behavior
should be compensated when a plaintiff is suing a corporation or an
employer, not another spouse:
Does society really want to send a message that in effect states
that in America the way we deal with an emotionally abusive mar-
riage is to turn it into a lawsuit for cash? Again, such suits against
businesses are another matter entirely. In business, the bottom
line is cash, and forcing the disgorging of cash when conduct has
been outrageous seems to be more appropriate.282
In their view, family law is better equipped than tort law to ad-
dress emotional harm between spouses, unless the behavior of one
of the parties is punishable under criminal law. This is the only cir-
cumstance where tort lawyers should intervene. By pushing litigation
away from tort law and into family law, Ellman and Sugarman re-
vamp the family/market dichotomy in private law reasoning. In doing
so, they reduce emotional and intimate harm to a family matter while
limiting tort law to harms only occurring in the market.
C. Family Law Exceptionalism in Tort Law
Family law exceptionalism (FLE) literature uses several tools
to show that family law should not be viewed through the lens of a
281. Id. at 1288–89.
282. Id. at 1290.
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market/family dichotomy and, thus, exceptionalized as the sphere
of personal, exclusive, and affective relationships.283 This approach
reduces the family to a sphere of regulation concerned only with tra-
ditional values, emotions, and vulnerabilities. Conversely, the market
is enlarged to a sphere concerned with universal rights and economic
considerations. An example of the negative impact of FLE is the way
the law defines the family and its near exclusive concentration on
marriage, divorce, and parent-child relations. Because the current
boundaries of family law are so narrowly defined, the notion of FLE
has been substantially strengthened in private law reasoning.284
In an attempt to overcome the exceptional role of the family in
private law reasoning, strengthened by the pervasiveness of the
market/family dichotomy, Janet Halley and Kerry Rittich have de-
vised a unique terminology to reconceptualize family law. Halley and
Rittich group legal regimes, all of which are integral to family law,
into different categories entitled Family Law 1, 2, and 3, based on
their relation to the family.285 Each category includes legal regimes
that contribute to our understanding of how the family life is lived and
the household is structured, but in increasingly less obvious ways.286
The Family Law 1 (FL1) category includes legal regimes that
most obviously relate to family law matters, such as marriage, divorce,
and parental rights.287 FL1 regimes are those most often associated
with family law and most commonly taught in law school classes or
family law casebooks. The Family Law 2 (FL2) category includes
283. Halley & Rittich, supra note 9, at 753.
284. See id. at 761–70.
285. Id.
286. See Halley, supra note 14, at 899–900. Janet Halley explains the three regimes:
One is to undo the construction of family law by extending our topic beyond
the bounds they have been given in the emergence of FLE. We call the law
that happened to fall within family law Family Law 1. There is a lot of law
that directly regulates the family contained within legal topics commonly
understood to be both economically significant and nonfamilial: employment
law; the law governing social security programs, both public (welfare) and pri-
vate (pensions and the like); immigration law; criminal law; tax law; and the
list could go on. . . . We call that law Family Law 2. And we consider law that
helps to set the bargaining terms of family members with each other, with
employers, and so on, but that is silent about family relationships, to be
equally relevant, though hidden by FLE in the background. For instance, . . .
[t]he school funding and attendance laws do not mention families or family
law. But they have such a significant impact on the class strategies of actual
parents that it seems almost insane not to consider them Family Law. We
call law with this “disparate impact” on family behavior Family Law 3. Figur-
ing out how these three domains of family law interact is one way of undoing
the tendency of FLE to hide the economic functions of the family.
Id.
287. Halley & Rittich, supra note 9, at 761.
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regimes that affect, but are not directly part of FL1, such as tax law,
immigration law, labor law, and bankruptcy.288 With only a cursory
glance, FL2 regimes would “seem to have no primary commitment to
maintaining the distinctiveness of the family,” but in actuality have
provisions “peppered throughout” that explicitly target the family.289
The Family Law 3 (FL3) category is at the periphery and includes
legal or non-legal bargaining tools that affect the operation of family
relations, such as school funding, landlord/tenant law, and employ-
ment law.290 School funding, for instance, deeply affects the residency
choices of families with kids. A particularly interesting analysis would
show how all three regimes play an important role in how we struc-
ture our family relations.
In deploying the FL1, FL2, and FL3 terminology in intimate lia-
bility, Ellman and Sugarman are attempting to move interspousal
torts from FL2 to FL1 in an effort to purge tort law from emotional,
moral, and affective considerations that they consider ill-suited for
the tort system. However, there are other forces at work in the same
direction. For instance, the current insurance regime (found in FL3),
supported by tort-reform advocates, has limited the possibility of
plaintiffs to recover from insurance companies by successfully ex-
cluding intentional torts from household and personal policies.291 As
a consequence, tort lawyers working on contingency fees have no in-
centive to bring IIED claims unless there is a deep pocket defender
involved in the litigation. In most cases, the exclusion of these torts
from insurance policies is the main reason why only a few well-off
plaintiffs are likely to sue their spouses.292
By steering emotional and relational harm claims towards family
law (FL1), tort scholars have hidden the economic relevance of tort
claims that aim to compensate emotional wrongs based on fault or
intent between intimate parties. According to them, emotional harm
between spouses should be assessed and compensated in a divorce
proceeding. In doing so, however, tort scholars have not fully explored
the bargaining power and the economic impact that interspousal torts
create on family relations.293 For instance, even in divorce litigation,
family lawyers can strategically deploy interspousal torts as a way to
bargain on behalf of their clients. Likewise, for social conservatives,
these torts represent the possibility to create a higher evidentiary bar
for divorce.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 762.
291. Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 1288.
292. Id.
293. See Halley & Rittich, supra note 9, at 760.
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Finally, Ellman and Sugarman have limited IIED and negligent
infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claims to only those arising in
families recognized by the law, excluding possible tort claims arising
between cohabitants or same-sex partners. In expanding our concep-
tion of family beyond the legal paradigm created by FLE, Janet Halley
explains that this would involve:
[U]ndo[ing] the construction of the social family to take into ac-
count dependency relations that intertwine those of spouses, legal
cohabitants, and parent and child but that did not make it into the
legal family. The term “family” entrenches marriage and parentage
and occludes many additional and/or alternative economic relations
that are continually routing through the domestic space.294
The steering of interspousal torts into FL1 has limited the pos-
sibility to expand intimate liability beyond marriage and attempt to
compensate emotional harm in relationships based on cohabitation
or same-sex partnerships. In a similar way, the feminist, reformist
agenda has supported interspousal torts beyond the marriage frame-
work, but based on heteronormative relations in which a male perpe-
trator emotionally abuses a woman victim. FLE departs from these
stereotyped gender roles to understand intertwined affective and
economic relations that characterize intimate relationships.295
III. STEREOTYPED NARRATIVES IN THE FAMILY AND THE MARKET
This Part offers taxonomy of the different interspousal torts
claims that courts have increasingly grappled with since the mid-
1980s. Despite the fact that a majority of claims are based on IIED,
some claims, in some limited jurisdictions, rely on old amatory torts.
These cases idealize the definition of a relationship, suggesting that
their acceptance varies depending on whether the relationship is
perceived as part of life in the family, or in the market.296 As Table 1
below illustrates, these stereotypical roles include the victim, the
cheating wife, the free consenter, and the seductive secretary. The
use of these “ideal types” denies many women justice because they
do not fit into, or are unwilling to portray themselves in terms of,
these stereotypes. Thus, despite feminists’ and social conservatives’
willingness to expand liability between couples to protect a woman’s
dignity or family honor, intentional torts are neither compensating
294. Halley, supra note 14, at 900.
295. See STACEY, supra note 279, at 5.
296. See Olsen, supra note 10, at 1500–02; see also Nicola, supra note 20, at 650.
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women nor fully deterring emotionally abusive behavior to the extent
that proponents might like.
TABLE 1: THE TAXONOMY OF U.S. INTERSPOUSAL TORTS
FEMINISTS SOCIAL CONSERVATIVES
FAMILY The VictimTwyman v. Twyman
The Cheating Wife
Koestler v. Pollard
MARKET The Reasonable ConsumerNeal v. Neal
The Secretary
Hutelmyer v. Cox
The first two cases, Twyman v. Twyman297 and Neal v. Neal,298
illustrate current feminist strategies, portraying plaintiffs in assigned
stereotypical roles, the victim and the free chooser, respectively, to
bring interspousal claims or IIED against their lovers. In the second
set of cases, Koestler v. Pollard299 and Hutelmyer v. Cox,300 social con-
servatives have portrayed the defendants as the cheating wife or the
secretary, in order to allow husbands and wives to sue the adulterous
spouse and recover through IIED claims or amatory torts in jurisdic-
tions that still maintain such causes of actions.
A. The Powerless Victim
It is beyond dispute that women are most often the victims of
domestic violence and harmful conduct by spouses and significant
others. At the same time, however, because family law plays an “ex-
ceptional role” in our legal regime,301 tort lawyers have not widely
supported intentional torts that compensate for emotional harm in
the domestic sphere. Whereas the home was seen as a realm of the
exclusive competence of family law, tort lawyers have not shied away
from compensating plaintiffs for emotional harm suffered in the work-
place or other market relations. Not surprisingly, when social conser-
vatives and feminists hijacked intimate liability to implement their
297. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
298. 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994).
299. 471 N.W.2d 7, 7–8 (Wis. 1991).
300. 514 S.E.2d 554, 557 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
301. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman, The Story of Twyman v. Twyman: Politics, Tort Reform,
and Emotional Distress in a Texas Divorce, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 243, 264 (Carol Sanger
ed., 2008); Halley & Rittich, supra note 9, at 754.
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political agenda, they portrayed women in the home as victims and
treated them differently from tort claims governed by market ideals.
For instance, the case of Twyman v. Twyman illustrates both
the progress and the limitations of interspousal torts when women
are portrayed as victims.302 On one hand, this is a landmark case
because the plaintiff prevailed on her emotional distress claim. For
the first time, the Texas Supreme Court recognized the existence of
an IIED-based claim that allowed a wife to collect damages from her
husband.303 Sheila Twyman also elicited a strong dissenting opinion
in support of her claim for NIED.304 But, there was considerable back-
lash against the dissenting opinion,305 and Sheila did not succeed on
her NIED claim.306 Sheila claimed that her husband forced her to per-
form sadomasochistic sex acts, even though he knew she, a victim of
rape, was terrified of such acts.307 The court held that Sheila’s IIED
claim was valid against her husband, whose behavior was found to be
objectively outrageous. However, the Texas Supreme Court dismissed
Sheila’s NIED claim.308
Judge Rose Spector, the only female and feminist on the Texas
Supreme Court at the time, wrote a strong dissenting opinion regard-
ing the NIED claim.309 She argued that Sheila should recover for both
IIED and NIED because of the offensive conduct of Sheila’s husband.
According to Judge Spector, in order to remedy the injustices women
confront in our society, Sheila deserved to recover under both claims.310
A negligence claim could have resulted in higher damages because
it would have allowed her to seek damages from her household in-
surance policy.311 If women could recover under a negligence stan-
dard as well, Judge Spector suggested that NIED claims would have
a broader compensatory function.312 Whereas an IIED claim addresses
only the abuse in the context of marriage, an NIED cause of action
speaks to the general duty of care society recognizes to plaintiffs. In
Judge Spector’s view, and others’, women are victims of both certain
marriages and society as a whole.313
302. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
303. Id. at 620.
304. Id. at 640–45 (Spector, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 638–39; Bender, supra note 92, at 150.
306. Cossman, supra note 301, at 248.
307. Id. at 243.
308. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 640–45 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 640, 643.
311. See, e.g., Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 604 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzalez, J., concurring
opinion on motion for rehearing).
312. See, e.g., id.
313. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 92, at 149; Natalie Kay Fox, Case Note, Family/Tort
Law—Through the Eyes and Ears of Children: A Significant Advance for Third Parties
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Scholars have cited Judge Spector’s opinion as an important ex-
pression of feminists’ views in tort law. However, the reiteration of
those views triggered backlash, especially among male judges, who
disputed the victim narrative in Sheila’s story and did not allow Sheila
to prevail on the NIED claim.314
As feminist Leslie Bender explains, “[c]ases like Twyman clearly
show how much gender matters in tort law and how tort law has been
and often continues to be unavailable or unresponsive to women’s
needs in the locations, like the home, where women are most often
injured by others.” 315 Even after Twyman, NIED claims in the inter-
spousal setting continue to fail for a variety of reasons. Although
feminists support NIED claims for domestic torts, conservatives have
argued against expanding domestic liability to corporate entities.316
“On this specific issue, domestic torts reforms have led to divergence
between feminists and social conservatives rather than cohesion.” 317
NIED claims are usually brought against insurers because they can
afford the damages. Courts have been suspicious of the authenticity
of such cases.318 For the most part, insurance companies have been
successful in rolling back tort liability as part of the larger tort reform
movement over the last few decades, and in that sense, Sheila’s claim
was poorly timed.319
As Brenda Cossman points out, Sheila’s case came “to represent
a tort that she was never able to realize, and a debate on the place of
fault in divorce law that did not buy her the conservative allies that
might have been expected.” 320 In explaining that Sheila ultimately
did not get any compensation from the case, Cossman shows that
Twyman is not a paramount case for showcasing gender dynamics
but, rather, for the exceptional role that family plays in our legal
regime. . . . [T]he best reading of this story . . . is that Sheila was the
helpless victim and the perpetrator, her husband, was easily identifi-
able within the domestic walls.321
Exposed to Domestic Violence. Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013 (Wyo. 2002), 3 WYO. L. REV.
735, 750 (2003); Mae C. Quinn, Note, The Garden Path of Boyles v. Kerr and Twyman
v. Twyman: An Outrageous Response to Victims of Sexual Misconduct, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L. 247, 254–55 (1995). But see Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013, 1020–21 (Wyo. 2002) (declin-
ing to hold that domestic violence was per se outrageous).
314. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Toward a “Culturally Cliterate” Family Law?, 23
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 267, 332 (2008); see also Bender, supra note 92, at 150.
315. See Bender, supra note 92, at 150.
316. Cossman, supra note 301, at 252.
317. Nicola, supra note 20, at 666.
318. See Dalton, supra note 3, at 386; Nicola, supra note 20, at 666.
319. See Cossman, supra note 196, at 426.
320. See Cossman, supra note 301, at 266.
321. Nicola, supra note 20, at 667; see Appleton, supra note 314, at 321.
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When we analyze the behavior of William and Sheila Twyman,322
Janet Halley suggests reading the facts of the case in terms of “the
power of each individual in the particular context in which they acted,
rather than relying on preexisting gender stereotypes ‘without a vic-
tim and a victimizer, without dominance and submission, but with
power.’ ” 323 From the bigger picture, Halley would have us remove our-
selves from “[f]eminist convergentism and paranoid structuralism,”
which deny women power, especially in legal circles.324 According to
Halley, “feminism has concentrated our attention only on the differ-
ences between the two genders and the subordination of women by
men, or ‘M>F.’ ” 325 By taking a break from feminism one could also
take a break from the victimizing narrative of Sheila and the domi-
nating role of William, who is the one in this story who retains the
power to determine the couple’s sexual practices. There is little talk
of Sheila’s preference or the type of sex or relation she would have
wished for in her husband.
The complexity Halley adds to the Twyman narrative would have
been a poor fit with the IIED claim, making it harder to assign blame
only to William instead of sharing responsibility between William
and Sheila.326 Departing from the victimizing narrative and focusing
on a more complex story about the relationship between Sheila and
her husband, such as their societal roles, jobs, education, families,
and character, might have introduced the consideration of other
“situational” factors that led to the abuse.
B. The Reasonable Consumer
In some battery and IIED cases, feminist advocates have focused
on the doctrine of vitiated consent and how consent is affected by
“women’s reasonable choices.” These feminists “have used notions
322. See Brenda Cossman et al., Gender, Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory
Enough?, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601, 602 (2003).
323. Nicola, supra note 20, at 666 (citing Cossman et al., supra note 322, at 616).
324. See Cossman et al., supra note 322, at 608.
325. Nicola, supra note 20, at 667 (citing Cossman et al., supra note 322, at 605).
Cossman explains that queer critique of the expansion of liability seeks to take a break
from feminists’ definitional stakes. This break would allow jurists to rethink the feminist
foundations and its boundaries in order to translate them into a left libertarian policy
approach that would want to keep the state outside our intimate desires. Cossman et al.,
supra note 322, at 608, 616 (showing that, although she does not abandon feminism, Halley
proposes putting it on stand-by in order to better assess what the costs and benefits of the
feminist subordination model are for both men and women in cases like Twyman).
326. See Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial)
Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 423–24 (2006); Jon Hanson & David
Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism,
Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 136–37 (2003).
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of individual rights and autonomy to depict women’s ability to choose
how to dispose of their bodies, their sexuality, and their reproductive
abilities.” 327 The stereotyped woman in domestic tort cases has be-
come “the free chooser.” 328 The free chooser controls what she buys,
her rights, and her job, but she must be reasonable in the home. The
doctrine of consent, although normally a defense,329 is being trans-
formed by feminist advocates into a strategic weapon in a woman’s
arsenal to protect herself in sexual relationships.330
Doctrinally, the reasonable consumer cases tend to turn on the
issue of informed, meaningful consent. Plaintiffs have brought success-
ful IIED and battery claims against former sexual partners by arguing
that they lacked adequate information.331 By withholding information,
these sexual partners violated their duty of care, and thus, the plain-
tiffs could not give informed consent. In cases in which a sexual part-
ner with a sexually transmitted disease did not inform the plaintiff
of this fact, courts have held that consent was vitiated.332 For example,
in Barbara A. v. John G., the defendant (the plaintiff’s divorce lawyer)
told the plaintiff, “I can’t possibly get anyone pregnant.” 333 After suf-
fering injuries from the resulting pregnancy, Barbara sued and won,
claiming her consent was vitiated because her sexual partner had lied
and was in fact fertile.334
In Neal v. Neal, the Idaho Supreme Court extended this doctrine
into the realm of domestic torts. After discovering her husband’s ex-
tramarital affair, Mary Neal sued for battery.335 The cause of action
alleged that, “although she consented to sexual intercourse with her
husband during the time of his affair, had she known of his sexual
involvement with another woman, she would not have consented, as
sexual relations under those circumstances would have been offensive
to her.” 336 Her consent was vitiated because her husband had with-
held the information necessary for her to give informed consent.337
The court disagreed, holding that divorce was the plaintiff’s exclu-
sive remedy because criminal conversation had been eliminated as
327. Nicola, supra note 20, at 669.
328. Id.
329. LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX
126, 137–39 (1998).
330. Id. at 137, 141.
331. Madden v. Abate, 800 F. Supp. 2d 604, 609–11 (D. Vt. 2011); Weaver v. Pardue,
No. M2010-00124-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4272687, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2010).
332. See, e.g., Tischler v. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 1004, 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
333. 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 422 (Ct. App. 1983).
334. Id. at 426.
335. See Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994).
336. Id. at 876.
337. See id.
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a tort in Idaho.338 Furthermore, Mary could not recover for emotional
distress, as the facts were inadequate to establish the requisite rea-
sonable fear.339
The vitiated consent doctrine reinforces the reasonable consumer
stereotype. If a woman has enough information regarding the situa-
tion, she is free to choose and give meaningful consent. However, from
a feminist standpoint, the emergence of the vitiated consent doctrine
“contradicts a long feminist tradition of criticizing the way judges
and juries have relied on consent to dismiss instances of coercion, mis-
information, and behavior.” 340 O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., Ltd.,341 in
which an Irish immigrant woman received a small pox vaccination,
illustrates this point. Mary’s actions, raising her arm so the vaccine
could be given, were enough to persuade the court that Mary had
given consent.342
Ann C. Shalleck argues that the court mistakenly assumed that
Mary had unfettered agency.343 Furthermore, in looking at the law-
yers’ briefs, Shalleck explains that the doctor’s and the shipowner’s
testimonies carried more weight with the court than did Mary’s. By
weighing the testimony unequally, and assuming Mary had the ability
to consent freely, the court concluded that Mary had given consent.344
The problem with the reasonable consumer narrative is that it
recognizes only the most salient and egregious sources of coercion
or disparities in power.345 A woman who has sex with her lawyer or
therapist may have given consent; however, in both cases, these are
male professionals who had the women’s trust because of their pro-
fessional positions.346
C. The Cheating Wife
Today, social conservatives and pro-marriage advocates seek to
expand liability for interspousal torts to protect the honor of the fam-
ily and punish the immoral behavior of adulterers.347 Rather than
resume old amatory torts against paramours and lovers that rely on
outdated notions of women’s honor and chivalry, social conservatives
338. Id. at 875.
339. See id. at 875.
340. Nicola, supra note 20, at 670.
341. 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891).
342. Id.
343. See Ann C. Shalleck, Feminist Legal Theory and the Reading of O’Brien v. Cunard,
57 MO. L. REV. 371, 371 (1992).
344. See id. at 379–82.
345. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 326, at 289.
346. See Bender, supra note 92, at 158–60.
347. Berger, supra note 23, at 451, 531.
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use IIED claims. In some cases, women have been successfully sued
for lying about a child’s paternity to their husbands.348
These social conservatives maintain that this behavior is an out-
rageous affront to the husband’s dignity, a wrong that satisfies IIED
because “[f ]raudulently creating a parental relationship that im-
poses legal obligations and allows parent and child to form emotional
bonds with the knowledge that the relationship could be disrupted
at any moment is extreme conduct, highly likely to inflict emotional
harm.” 349 As in the old amatory torts, the husband can choose to
bring an IIED claim against the “cheating wife” or the wife’s par-
amour. Yet while the old torts protected the woman, these new IIED
claims serve very different functions: to restore the family’s honor,
in particular the cuckolded husband’s and the children’s reputation,
while faulting the immoral wife and her seducer.350
In a famous case, Koestler v. Pollard, Richard was raising a child
with his wife, Vicky. Richard believed that the child was his; however,
the biological father was Donald Pollard, who had an extramarital
relationship with his wife.351 Koestler sued Pollard for IIED because
Pollard had not told Richard he was the father and this allowed him
to emotionally bond with the child.352 The court held that Koestler
could not recover for IIED because the complaint was essentially an
amatory tort, and the legislature had abolished amatory torts.353
The dissent argued that the IIED claim was allowable because
IIED enabled recovery “for injury to the plaintiff’s well-being.” 354
Furthermore, the dissent stressed IIED had not been abolished by
the state legislature.355 Some scholars agreed with the dissent be-
cause IIED claims allowed for a suit against the lover and the adul-
terous spouse and “[g]iven the complex factual circumstances of
most adultery-based claims, it can sometimes seem like the adulterer
should be held responsible and in other cases the paramour. . . .
IIED allows the plaintiff and jury to decide who is responsible and
to what degree.” 356
In a similar New Jersey case, the husband succeeded in win-
ning an IIED claim against his wife’s lover.357 The husband filed a
348. See id. at 531; see, e.g., Steve H. v. Wendy S., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90, 90 97 (Ct. App.
1997); G.A.W. III v. D.M.W., 596 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); Koepke v. Koepke,
556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
349. See Berger, supra note 23, at 529.
350. See Koestler v. Pollard, 471 N.W.2d 7, 7–8 (Wis. 1991).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 11–12.
354. Id. at 13 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
355. Id. at 12.
356. Patel, supra note 181, at 1049–50.
357. See C.M. v. J.M., 726 A.2d 998, 998 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999), abrogated by
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third-party complaint for IIED against his wife’s paramour in a
divorce proceeding when he found out he was not the true father of
several children born during his marriage.358 The court denied the
paramour’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the state’s abolition
of actions for alienation barred IIED claims.359 The court found instead
that the core of the action was the failure to inform plaintiff of the
true paternity of the children and that the extreme and outrageous
conduct was not the affair but the devastating effect upon himself and
the children.360
Despite the similarity with heart balms, these IIED cases per-
form a different function from the old amatory torts. Like heart balms,
the IIED claims protect family honor, but IIED claims also now pro-
tect the institution of family and the honor of the cheated husband
who behaved according to moral norms.361 Rather than offer the wife
a second chance,362 these interspousal cases blame and punish the
cheating wife, who has hidden from her husband both the affair and
the real paternity of the children involved.
D. The Sexy Secretary
The sexy secretary is the final stereotypical role for women that
social conservatives advocate in interspousal torts. The sexy secre-
tary is the archetypical seductress. The immoral sexual desires of
the secretary corrupt the husband. This narrative is embodied in
Hutelmyer v. Cox.363 Dorothy and Joseph Hutelmyer were married
for seventeen years and were a model, churchgoing couple with three
children.364 However, this all changed when Joseph’s secretary, Mar-
garet (Margie) Cox, began wearing “short skirts, low-cut blouses, and
tight clothing.” 365 Eventually, Dorothy and Joseph’s marriage began
to falter as Joseph began having an affair with his secretary.366
Dorothy sued Margie Cox for alienation of affection and criminal
conversation after she learned of the affair.367 She filed the suit in
R.A.C. v. P.J.S., 880 A.2d 1179, 1192 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2005), rev’d sub nom. on
other grounds R.A.C. v. P.J.S., Jr., 927 A.2d 97 (N.J. 2007).
358. Id. at 999–1000.
359. Id. at 1004.
360. See id.
361. Nicola, supra note 20, at 672.
362. See Paul M. Schwartz, From Victorian Secrets to Cyberspace Shaming, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1407, 1411–13 (2009) (reviewing FRIEDMAN, supra note 174).
363. See ROBERT F. COCHRAN JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND COMMUNITY:
THE CASE OF TORTS 78–83 (2004) (discussing the case and alienation of affection causes
of action).
364. Hutelmyer v. Cox, 514 S.E.2d 554, 557 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
365. Id.
366. Id. at 557–58.
367. Id. at 556.
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North Carolina, which not only had yet to abolish these amatory torts,
but also still allowed for large punitive damages. Dorothy argued that
the love that “once existed between her and her husband was alien-
ated and destroyed by defendant’s conduct. In 1992, following the
breakup of her marriage, defendant openly flirted with plaintiff ’s
husband and spent increasingly more time alone with him.” 368 Also,
there was support for her request for punitive damages because the
“defendant publicly displayed the intimate nature of her relation-
ship with Joseph by holding hands at work or by straightening his
ties or brushing lint from his suits.” 369
The court allowed the claim, and the jury returned a verdict
against the secretary that totaled $1 million after Dorothy success-
fully proved damages from emotional distress and humiliation, com-
bined with the loss of her husband’s salary.370 The reactions to the
Hutelmyer v. Cox case reflect the conflicting ideologies animating
these torts. With respect to assigning fault, the reactions to the deci-
sion ranged from those of liberals, who feared that such cases would
transform the no-fault divorce regime by making adultery relevant to
the marital breakdown and the consequent distribution of property,371
to those of social conservatives, who applauded this case as a way of
strengthening the moral obligations arising from a marriage, preserv-
ing the honor of the family, and punishing the paramour.372
Social conservatives heralded the decision, applauding the court
for strengthening traditional marriage, punishing the secretary, and
deterring divorce.373 For conservatives, both the husband and wife are
victims of the sexy secretary.374
The court’s ruling elicited a harsh backlash. One commentator
railed against the court for its assumption that the husband appar-
ently had “no self will.” 375 This simplistic stance, blaming the secretary
and assuming that the husband had been awestruck by a mermaid,
ought to be challenged. The lawsuit also had implications for the
paramours—in this case, a secretary—at least in North Carolina.
This ruling reinforced that idea that the career woman is a threat
to the family. In contrast, the loving, stay-at-home mom is rewarded
for her traditional values.
368. Id. at 559.
369. Nicola, supra note 20, at 672 (quoting Hutelmyer, 514 S.E.2d at 560) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
370. See Hutelmyer, 514 S.E.2d at 561, 562.
371. See COCHRAN JR. & ACKERMAN, supra note 363, at 80–81.
372. Id.
373. See id.
374. See id. at 81.
375. Id.
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But on the other hand, no one really knows about Margie’s situa-
tion. Was she really a sexy seductress trying to destroy a marriage?
Or did she think Joseph had already left his wife as he had previously
told her? Maybe Joseph would have ended the marriage anyway,
and he pursued his secretary to facilitate his exit?376 The court in
Hutelmyer ignores these questions.
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING INTIMATE LIABILITY
Some scholars have sought to reform intimate liability in order
to deter abusive emotional behavior through a more effective tort
remedy. The work of Constance Ward Cole represents one of the most
comprehensive contributions. By taking into account psychological
evidence, Cole considers IIED to be an important yet under-analyzed
tort doctrine to redress emotional and mental distress inflicted by
family members.377 She suggests reconceptualizing IIED through an
internal balancing standard that takes into consideration the interests
and rights, as well as the defenses and the privileges, of each party.378
Her new analytical framework for balancing the gravity of the injury
and the outrageousness of the alleged abusive behavior included im-
portant contextual and psychological factors. In attempting to influ-
ence the practice of tort law, however, Cole underestimated how much
tort and family law scholars alike have tainted intimate liability by
relegating it to a family matter within the narrow boundaries of FL1.
This Part reconceptualizes intimate liability informed by its doc-
trinal and historical development summarized in Part I, the theo-
retical approaches analyzed in Part II, and the litigation strategies
promoted by feminist and social conservative reformers in Part III.
In showing the current impact of intimate liability litigation, this Part
focuses on jurisdictional, cultural, and practical obstacles affecting
tort litigation. In particular, the fragmentation of amatory torts across
jurisdictional lines and the advantage of married couples in bringing
IIED claims show that cohabitants and same-sex partners are most
unlikely to recover damages against an emotionally abusive partner.
Rather than confining intimate liability to a remedy under FL1, this
Part sketches the contours of a stand-alone tort remedy seeking to
376. Nicola, supra note 20, at 672.
377. See Constance Ward Cole, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Among
Family Members, 61 DENV. L.J. 553, 553 (1984) (relying on family psychology to explain
that the interdependence between family members is the most likely cause of unhappiness
and mental distress).
378. Id. at 572–73.
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deter abusive, emotional behavior enabled by relationships where
economic and emotional vulnerabilities are deeply intertwined.
A. The Fragmentation of Amatory Torts
By the late 1990s, all the states, with the exception of Louisiana,
abolished interspousal immunities. However, recovering damages for
intimate liability remains difficult for a number of reasons.379 Courts
have often rejected IIED claims between spouses and third parties
because of the claims’ troubling overlap with old amatory torts.380 In
addition, courts have rejected torts arising in intimate or family rela-
tions for a variety of different policy reasons, such as the possibility
of a flood of litigation, fraud, and collusion among spouses.381 The abo-
lition of family immunities, however, did not open the floodgates of
interspousal tort litigation. Nor did it clog the court system as many
had predicted with serious, frivolous, or phony, claims.382 Though some
courts have been rather strict in allowing plaintiffs to pursue these
torts, few others have gone as far as allowing non-married couples to
bring these claims.383 Overall, the geographical fragmentation and
the attitudes of different jurisdictions have played an important role
in expanding or limiting intimate liability.
In spite of growing interest and the occasional news story in-
volving a personality like Tiger Woods, which creates inflammatory
opinions,384 the impact of intimate liability remains relatively limited
when considering the litigation triggered by either interspousal or
amatory torts. Not only have tort scholars and family law scholars
379. Id. at 561–62.
380. See Bland v. Hill, 735 So. 2d 414, 421 (Miss. 1999) (maintaining action for alienation
of affection although it abolished tort for criminal conversation); Veeder v. Kennedy, 589
N.W.2d 610, 616 (S.D. 1999) (maintaining action for alienation of affection despite acknowl-
edging trend to abolish it because abolition should come from the legislature, and because
abolishing it would be a “stamp of approval” of immoral behavior).
381. See Gaspard v. Beadle, 36 S.W.3d 229, 238 (Tex. App. 2001) (finding a claim for
IIED legally insufficient when a lawyer who was involved with a client broke up with
her and then sent her a bill, finding that the “timing of his bill and the manner in which
[he] performed the legal work was not prudent; however, sending someone a bill and
ending a relationship with them at the same time is simply not extreme and outrageous
behavior”); Doe v. Zwelling, 620 S.E.2d 750, 752–53 (Va. 2005) (reversing trial court’s
dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint alleging professional malpractice against a therapist
who used confidential information to malign plaintiff with his spouse and enter into a
relationship with her and finding that plaintiff could proceed on claims of professional
malpractice for harms caused to interests independent of the marriage relationship).
382. See Wriggins, supra note 25, at 253.
383. See Table 3, infra Part IV.B.
384. See John Day, Does Ms. Tiger Woods Have a Tort Claim Against the Other Woman?,
DAY ON TORTS (Dec. 2, 2009, 8:41 PM), http://www.dayontorts.com/miscellaneous-does
-ms-tiger-woods-have-a-tort-claim-against-the-other-woman.html.
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looked with great skepticism at intimate liability,385 but because of the
exclusion of insurance coverage,386 interspousal tort litigations have
appeared more available to upper-middle-class families with enough
assets to sustain litigation. For lower- and middle-income married
couples who are excluded from liability insurance and constrained by
the existence of a deep-pocket defendant, intimate liability is a bad
gamble. For these couples, the exclusion of insurance coverage for
family members and for intentional torts from homeowners’ policies
precludes their ability to access litigation. In this respect, Jennifer
Wriggins writes that: “Interspousal immunity has reappeared in a
new guise—the guise of private insurance. The archaic mechanism for
protecting actors who cause harm within families has been replaced
by a new, more subtle mechanism. That mechanism is private liabil-
ity insurance contracts which exclude coverage for intentional torts
between family members.” 387
If the insurance exclusion is one important factor affecting mid-
dle class couples, another feature that limits the potential impact of
these lawsuits is the reluctance that plaintiffs have with bringing
these actions and seeing the cases tried. These torts involve deeply
emotional circumstances and are ill-suited to the adversarial and
“dispositionist” nature of the legal system which dismisses some situ-
ational constraints.388 For these reasons, some scholars have pro-
posed that the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) regime may be
more appropriate because it could best protect the private sphere of
affective relations by maintaining confidentiality while still achieving
economic settlements.389 Yet private remedies such as mediation and
ADR have been criticized for portraying both the family and the mar-
ket as highly privatized spheres, meaning that the law should mini-
mally intervene or stay away from it.390
Finally, because of the doctrinal complexity derived from the
geographical fragmentation of state common law rules, plaintiffs
have used radically different tort doctrines to recover for emotional
385. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 1271–72; Krause, supra note 238, at
1366 (“[R]elying on existing tort law to deal with marital misconduct is the worst-case
alternative.”).
386. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 38, at 71 (explaining that the lack of in-
surance coverage for domestic violence has inhibited tort litigation brought by lawyers on
contingency fees).
387. See Wriggins, supra note 25, at 254.
388. See Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1345,
1366–71 (2008); Nicola, supra note 20, at 650–51.
389. See Shmueli, supra note 74, at 248–49; see also Amy J. Cohen, The Family, the
Market, and ADR, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 91, 93 (2011) (noting the economic and social
benefits of ADR).
390. See Olsen, supra note 10, at 1506–07.
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harm in intimate relationships. In some states, plaintiffs rely on the
old amatory torts favored by social conservatives. In others, they use
tort actions based on the IIED claim, a dignitary tort favored by
feminists.391 In addressing interspousal torts, some courts have re-
jected IIED claims against a husband or a wife on the ground that
such claims were too similar to a prohibited heart balm or amatory
tort.392 In those states where amatory torts survive, though, social
conservatives are more likely to choose these causes of action as the
basis of their lawsuits rather than IIED.393 Therefore, the status of
these actions in different jurisdictions is an important factor for
their outcome.
Currently, alienation of affection has been abolished by statute
in thirty-four states and the District of Columbia, and four states
have abolished it by common law.394 The abolition of this amatory
tort can also bar actions of interference with parental relationship,
although many courts do not adopt this approach.395 At times, IIED
claims arising from cases of adultery succeed despite the overtones
of prohibited amatory torts primarily because the harm alleged is
independent of the affair itself.396 This overlap between amatory torts
and IIED taints the litigation with different meanings and cultural
norms that allow political reformers to promote their stereotyped nar-
ratives of gender roles in family relations. The tension raised by the
overlap of IIED and amatory tort doctrines is heightened by the juris-
dictional fragmentation that exists between states that still retain
some of the amatory tort actions and those that do not.
391. See Nicola, supra note 20, at 658.
392. See Bouchard v. Sundberg, 834 A.2d 744, 744–45 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (holding
that an ex-husband’s claims for IIED and NIED were nothing more than claims for alien-
ation of affections and consequently determined to be barred by a state anti–heart balm
act); Marjorie A. Shields, Action For Infliction of Emotional Distress Against Paramours,
99 A.L.R. 5th 445, 454 (2002) (showing that IIED actions brought by aggrieved spouses
in cases of adultery in some of these jurisdictions have been subject to challenge on the
grounds that the claims are essentially actions for alienation of affections or criminal
conversation “in disguise” and are, therefore, precluded by a state statutory or public policy
prohibition against such amatory claims).
393. Nicola, supra note 20, at 663.
394. See 54 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 135, § 5 (1999).
395. See Davis v. Hilton, 780 So. 2d 974, 975–76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (allowing such
a claim only in instances where there is “physical interference by third parties with the
custodial relationship”).
396. Bailey v. Searles-Bailey, 746 N.E.2d 1159, 1164 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (showing that
courts first determine whether the claim is one for an abolished amatory tort in disguise
and second, whether the harm to the plaintiff is “serious.” In this case, a former husband’s
IIED claim against his wife and her paramour relating to his discovery that he was not the
biological father of the child born during his marriage was not barred by Ohio’s statutory
abolition of amatory claims.).
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TABLE 2. THE VARIATION OF AMATORY TORTS ACCORDING
TO JURISDICTION
Alienation of
Affection
Criminal
Conversation
Seduction
Jurisdictions
where some
heart balm
torts still
stand
Hawaii
Kentucky
Illinois
Mississippi
Missouri
New Hampshire
New Mexico
North Carolina
South Dakota
Utah
Hawaii
Kansas
Maine
Mississippi
Missouri
North Carolina
Tennessee
Arkansas
Arizona
Connecticut
DC
Hawaii
Kansas
Maine
Missouri
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Mexico
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Texas
Vermont
Wisconsin
Limited
(but not
abolished)
by statute
South Carolina
Washington
Indiana—must be
a minor
Maryland—must
be a minor
Utah—unmarried
and under 18
B. IIED Litigation Beyond Marriage
Feminists and social conservatives alike are complicit in heighten-
ing the ideological struggle behind intimate liability by fostering ste-
reotyped narratives of men and women involved in tort litigations.397
Both sets of reformers have relied on heterosexual relations or on tra-
ditional family roles centered on marriage to compensate the victims
of emotional harm inflicted by intimate partners.398 This cultural
397. Nicola, supra note 20, at 674.
398. Id.
2013] INTIMATE LIABILITY 501
phenomenon has shaped intimate liability to favor plaintiffs in het-
erosexual relationships and married partners as opposed to same-
sex partners and cohabitants.
For instance, IIED cases have been successful in compensating
plaintiffs where the underlying claim involved a dispute concerning
the paternity of a child,399 interference with parental rights,400 assault
and battery,401 threatening or harassing behavior,402 unprotected sex-
ual relations putting the other spouse at risk,403 and even concealment
of the value of marital assets by one of the spouses.404
As premarital sex and cohabitation have become an important
social reality, courts have begun to address emotional harm between
non-married couples as well as married couples, but reception of IIED
claims for non-married couples is mixed.405 Table 3 below shows that
399. J.M. v. W.P., 726 A.2d 998, 1004 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999) (holding that
failure to disclose the paternity of children resulting from an affair “without regard to the
high degree of probable harm to defendant, would indeed lead the average member of the
community to exclaim ‘Outrageous!’ ”).
400. Kunz v. Deitch, 660 F. Supp. 679, 683–84 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding that grand-
parents’ interferences with a father’s right to see his child and their solicitations for
adoption of the child constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress).
401. Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Me. 1993) (holding that physical
violence occurring during a marriage was not subject to interspousal immunity).
402. Toles v. Toles, 45 S.W.3d 252, 262 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (“When repeated or ongoing
severe harassment is shown, the conduct should be evaluated as a whole in determining
whether it is extreme and outrageous.”).
403. Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350, 350–52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing wife to
bring IIED against husband for infecting her with genital warts).
404. Shelar v. Shelar, 910 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (recognizing wife’s IIED
claim against husband for tampering with marital assets and lying to plaintiff).
405. When the field of analysis is narrowed down to only intimate relationships such
as married couples, cohabitants, and same-sex partnerships, married couples seem to do
much better in court than non-married couples. In New York, for instance, a state court
held in the 1983 case Baron v. Jeffer that an intimate but unmarried couple should be
treated as the same in the eyes of the law for the purposes of IIED torts. 469 N.Y.S.2d 815,
816–17 (App. Div. 1983). The court reasoned that
[I]t would be contrary to public policy to recognize the existence of this type
of tort in the context of disputes, as here, arising out of the differences which
occur between persons who, although not married, have been living together
as husband and wife for an extended period of time (here, over two years).
Id. at 817. It referenced a 1968 opinion, Weicker v. Weicker, that barred IIED torts in the
context of matrimonial differences, claiming that to do otherwise “would result in a re-
vival of evils not unlike those which prompted the Legislature in 1935 to outlaw actions for
alienation of affections and criminal conversation.” Id. (citing Weicker v. Weicker, 237
N.E.2d 876, 877 (N.Y. 1968)). In the 2011 case Allam v. Meyers, however, a federal district
court used Weicker to overturn the logic expressed in Baron. No. 09 CIV. 10580(KMW),
2011 WL 721648, at *9 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011) (“The Court finds . . . Baron is in-
consistent with the policy concerns underlying the inter-spousal immunity doctrine.”).
It held that interspousal immunity bars only IIED claims premised on conduct occurring
specifically during the marriage. Id. at *9 (explaining those IIED claims which are
premised on conduct that occurred during the parties’ marriage must be dismissed pur-
suant to the interspousal immunity doctrine, but those IIED claims that are premised
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the majority of cases concerning interspousal torts involve married
couples. However, in a limited number of cases, non-married couples
have used IIED claims against their partners in more or less success-
ful ways.
TABLE 3. IIED CLAIMS FOR SPOUSES, NON-MARRIED PARTNERS AND
THIRD PARTIES
Married
Partner
v.
Married
Partner
[Cheated]
Married
Partner
v.
Third Party
[Cheating]
Married
Partner
v.
Third Party
Non-Married
Party
v.
Non-Married
Party
• Misrepre-
sentation of
paternity
• Emotional
abuse
• Physical
abuse (assault
& battery)
• Sexual abuse
& sexual
deviance
• Interference
with parental
rights
• Unprotected
sexual rela-
tions putting
spouse at risk
• Fraud
• Concealment
of value of
marital assets
• Interference
with
employment
• Misrepre-
sentation of
paternity
• Interference
with parental
rights
• Harm result-
ing from extra-
marital affair
on spouse and
children
• Harm result-
ing from ex-
tramarital
affair (similar
to abolished
action for
seduction)
• Unprotected
sexual rela-
tions putting
partner at
health risk
• Breach of
promise to
marry (similar
to abolished
amatory tort
and therefore
largely
unsuccessful)
• Emotional with
physical abuse
on conduct that occurred prior to the parties’ marriage are not affected by the interspousal
immunity doctrine).
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Early IIED successes for non-married plaintiffs were confined
mainly to actions that involved the potential spread of a sexually
transmitted disease. In these cases, the risk of physical harm allows
plaintiffs to recover for IIED, which remains in substance a “collat-
eral tort.” 406 One of the first such cases was B.N. v. K.K.,407 in which
a physician who knew he suffered from genital herpes entered into a
sexual relationship with a nurse without informing her of his condi-
tion, and the nurse contracted the disease.408 The nurse sued the
physician for fraud, negligence, and IIED.409 The court held that one
who knowingly engages in conduct that is highly likely to infect an-
other with an incurable disease has committed sufficiently extreme
and outrageous conduct to give rise to a cause of action for IIED.410
This case demonstrates that an IIED claim involving conduct between
mere sexual partners may stand. At times, however, courts create an
exceedingly high threshold for a finding of IIED, thus limiting its use
in addressing tortious conduct between partners.411
Courts have also permitted the maintenance of an action for
IIED amongst engaged couples in some small instances, such as a
bad faith promise to marry wherein a man who was already married
promised to marry the female plaintiff.412 The man participated with
the woman in planning the wedding and obtaining a marriage license,
but he then told her that he would not marry her on the morning of
the wedding.413 The court held that these actions might be suffi-
ciently “outrageous and intolerable in that they offend . . . generally
accepted standards of decency and morality.” 414
At the same time, however, the striking similarity between this
IIED claim and the old amatory tort of breach of promise to marry has
been used to deny this tort as a residue of the past.415 Even though the
rationale for an IIED between intimate partners and the old ama-
tory torts is completely different,416 these claims are unsuccessful in
406. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 38, at 68.
407. 538 A.2d 1175 (Md. 1988).
408. Id. at 1175.
409. Id. at 1177.
410. 88 AM. JUR. Trials 153 (2003).
411. See Robinson v. Louie (In re Louie), 213 B.R. 754, 759 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997) (find-
ing that a partner who discovered that his partner knowingly concealed his HIV-positive
status from him and yet engaged in high-risk sexual behavior with him did not have a
legally cognizable IIED claim because he was still HIV negative six months after the con-
tact that potentially could have infected him and he was therefore no longer able to sustain
a cause of action for IIED).
412. Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1995).
413. Id.
414. Id. at 687–88.
415. See Miller v. Ratner, 688 A.2d 976, 982 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
416. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 174, at 111–12.
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court because they are tainted by old amatory torts. Even though
IIED is recognized as an independent tort in most United States
jurisdictions, in practice, it has not entirely evolved away from its
Victorian origins, nor is it taken seriously enough by courts as an in-
dependent cause of action—without an additional battery or trans-
mission of sexual disease—to recover for emotional distress.417
Legally, there should be no specialized party definitions for es-
tablished torts such as IIED, and therefore, any non-married person
subject to tortious conduct “should legally be able to sue and be sued
without impediment regardless of any intimate relationship short
of marriage.” 418 Those IIED claims stemming from conduct between
non-married people, which have been found to be legally valid, often
pertain to conduct that had the potential to cause physical risk to the
plaintiff. Although actual physical harm is no longer a requirement
of an IIED claim,419 in practice, plaintiffs otherwise have very little
chance to recover, especially if they are not married. As a result, the
number of cases involving non-married couples is more limited, not
by law, but rather by practice. The fact that married couples are
more likely to recover also discourages attorneys operating on con-
tingency fees to represent a non-married plaintiff who has been emo-
tionally harmed by his or her partner. In addition, juries tend to be
biased and unsympathetic toward plaintiffs asking for damages in
cases where the litigants had premarital sex that was not sanctioned
by marriage.420
C. Affective and Economic Dependency in Cohabitation and
Same-Sex Relationships
Courts have addressed emotional harm between spouses and
non-married couples as well. Intimate liability amongst non-married
couples, including same-sex partners, has seen a minor surge. Courts
have been increasingly willing to accept these claims in the contexts
of a breach of promise to marry, emotional and physical abuse, ha-
rassment, and unprotected sexual relations that put partners at risk.
Conduct with potential to cause physical risk to the plaintiff is
a category of IIED claims between non-married couples that the courts
have most often found legally valid. This includes the spread of a sex-
ually transmitted disease. It is in this context, when a plaintiff has
417. See Cole, supra note 377, at 553–54.
418. Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Causes of Action in Tort for Spousal Abuse, in 41
CAUSES OF ACTION 407, § 18 (2d ed. 2009).
419. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. b (2012).
420. See Ford v. Douglas, 799 A.2d 448, 449 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
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suffered IIED as a consequence of a direct physical injury, that the
courts produce more predictable results.421 The acceptance of IIED
claims amongst non-married couples involving emotional risk, how-
ever, has not fared as well as those involving physical abuse.
However, confusion still exists regarding the reach of interspou-
sal immunity and whether such considerations should also encom-
pass alternative family structures beyond nuclear or legal families.
Because the success in court of an IIED claim is heavily tainted by
the underlying plaintiff-defendant relationship, amongst intimate
relationships, married partners have more success in recovering for
emotional distress.422
In the context of economic rather than affective dependency,
Daniel Givelber explains that: “When the parties have a pre-exist-
ing . . . relationship based or apparently based on contract, courts are
frequently willing to uphold determinations of outrageousness. . . .
When the parties are not bound by contract, the cases are fewer, the
results more unpredictable, and doctrine virtually nonexistent.” 423
Therefore, in a marriage, parties are bound by a contractual rela-
tionship that they have voluntarily entered. In contrast, in other in-
timate relationships that may look like marriage, those not bound by
a formal contract are likely to have more unpredictable results. This
partly explains the skepticism of courts to assess emotional harm in
relationships not sanctioned by marriage as a contract. Because of
consideration and reliance in a contract, the married plaintiff appears
more entitled to show that the emotional abuse arose in the context
of a formalized and long-term intimate relationship entailing both
affective and economic dependency.424
For example, in Stone v. Wall, a Florida court found that a
parental custody relationship should be entitled to no less legally
421. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Sheft, 989 F.2d 1105, 1105 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming a
verdict for IIED against an insurance company and in favor of insured’s victim, from
whom insured intentionally concealed that he had AIDS, in order to induce the victim
to engage in high risk sex); Behr v. Redmond, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97, 102, 105 (Ct. App.
2011) (citing a California state court that upheld an IIED verdict in favor of a former
girlfriend who contracted genital herpes from her former boyfriend, stating that “[a]
person who knows or should know he or she has herpes and fails to disclose that fact, or
misrepresents that he or she is disease-free, may be liable for transmitting the disease
to a sexual partner”); Deuschle v. Jobe, 30 S.W.3d 215, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
(reversing a lower court decision to hold that IIED was valid where the boyfriend of
plaintiff “tortiously infect[ed] her with herpes and genital warts”).
422. See supra Part III (addressing the stereotyped narratives promoted in these
cases). It is also worth noting that the number of IIED claims brought by married
couples dramatically dwarfs those brought by unmarried couples.
423. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 63 (1982).
424. See Khalifa v. Shannon, 945 A.2d 1244, 1268 (Md. 2008).
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recognized protection from unreasonable interference than business
or economic relationships.425 Therefore, the court recognized an action
for intentional interference with the parent-child relationship by al-
lowing the father to sue members of the family of his deceased wife
for not returning and hiding the child from him.426
In marriages as contracts and in parental custody cases, courts
have successfully demonstrated that affective relationships are char-
acterized by economic dependency, which in turn might lead to emo-
tional abuse. Yet, courts have not found cohabitants and same-sex
partners vulnerable to emotional harm in situations that entail both
affective and economic dependency, despite the fact that cohabita-
tion has become a social and economic reality in the United States as
one of the “fastest growing ‘family’ configuration[s] over the last two
decades.” 427 Further, an increasing number of states over the past
five years have recognized the validity of same-sex marriages.428
For instance, in cases involving emotional abuse between co-
habitants, the courts are often completely oblivious about the eco-
nomic dependency characterizing the relationship between two people
425. See Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1038 (Fla. 1999); see also Gouin v. Gouin, 249
F. Supp. 2d 62, 73 (D. Mass. 2003) (holding that under Massachusetts law allegations were
sufficient to allege IIED where: 1) the estranged husband knew or should have known his
conduct aimed at coercing the wife into relinquishing custody would cause her emotional
distress, 2) the actions were extreme and outrageous, and 3) the distress suffered was
severe); Bhama v. Bhama, 425 N.W.2d 733, 734–35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a
custodial parent’s creation of a negative relationship between a child and the non-custodial
parent could constitute conduct so outrageous that it could not be tolerated in a civilized
society and could thus support the non-custodial parent’s suit for IIED); FRANKLIN ET AL.,
supra note 97, at 922. But see Day v. Heller, 653 N.W.2d 475, 482 (Neb. 2002) (holding
that it was contrary to public policy to allow a former husband to recover for his IIED
claim of emotional harm he suffered by his former wife’s misrepresentation of the true
paternity of their purported child, which he claimed threatened to destroy his parent-child
relationship. The court worried about the children’s well-being and also thought that where
such plaintiffs established meaningful relationships with these children, it was not appro-
priate to award damages for the misrepresentation of the child’s paternity.); Segal v. Lynch,
993 A.2d 1229, 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (finding that although the state Heart
Balm Act did not bar plaintiff’s claim regarding the loss of a child’s affection because the
statute’s prohibitions were intended to apply only to causes of action alleging alienation
of affection arising out of and dependent upon a marital relationship, the claim was prob-
lematic from a public policy standpoint. The court reasoned that allowing a parent to uti-
lize a child’s loss of affection for him or her as grounds for civil liability against the other
parent could be abused by parents with no consideration of how such litigation would affect
the child.).
426. Stone, 734 So. 2d at 1047.
427. Christopher Kaczor, Marital Acts Without Marital Vows: Social Justice and Pre-
marital Sex, LIFEISSUES.NET, http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/kac/kac_12maritalacts.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
428. See Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map
(1).pdf (last updated July 6, 2011).
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living under the same roof. In Miller v. Ratner, plaintiff Lonnie Miller
moved in with her boyfriend, Warren Ratner, on the understanding
that they were “making a permanent commitment that would be fol-
lowed by marriage.” 429 After three years of living together, Lonnie
became seriously ill with breast cancer.430 Warren was at first sup-
portive but later decided to terminate the relationship and ordered
Lonnie to leave his house.431 Upon her refusal, Lonnie claims Warren
and his brother conspired to inflict emotional distress on her in an ef-
fort to cause her to leave the house and his life.432 While plaintiff was
undergoing radiation treatment, Warren repeatedly woke her up in
the middle of the night, threatened her with bodily harm if she did
not leave his house, and admonished that she was a financial burden
and would soon die.433 Warren’s equally upstanding brother repeat-
edly telephoned the house to call Lonnie a “bitch,” “whore,” and “one-
breasted woman”—saying Warren “deserves a whole woman, not a
one breasted woman.” 434 The court held that, although the brothers’
actions were morally reprehensible, they were not legally reprehen-
sible. Lonnie’s IIED claims were “fatally tainted” by the statutorily
prohibited breach of promise aspect.435 According to the court, the
IIED claim was primarily based on Warren’s attempt to terminate
his promise to marry and take care of Lonnie.436
Just like cohabitants, parties that are intimately bound but who
are not part of a traditionally defined, heterosexual marriage, have
obtained unpredictable results through intimate liability. First, the
limited number of claims brought by homosexual partners over-
whelmingly concerns the spread of a sexually transmitted disease.
This is still true today despite the growing acceptance of legal rights
for same-sex marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships by the
states.437 IIED claims for same-sex relationships have not correspond-
ingly grown, nor have the types of IIED claims brought by same-sex
couples substantially broadened in scope by showing that affective
and economic vulnerabilities are inevitably intertwined.
For instance, in Plaza v. Estate of Wisser, a New York court
addressed such issues in a third-party suit against the estate and
429. Miller v. Ratner, 688 A.2d. 976, 979 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
430. Id. at 978.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 979.
433. Id. at 978.
434. Id.
435. Miller, 685 A.2d at 994.
436. Id. at 995 (“However vile and repugnant the Ratner’s actions were, if true,
Warren Ratner nevertheless had the legal right to ask [Lonnie] to leave and to cause her
to leave.”).
437. Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition Laws, supra note 428.
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parents of plaintiff Jose Manuel Plaza’s deceased companion, Scott
Allen Wisser, who died from AIDS-related complications.438 Jose’s
IIED claims were brought against Scott’s parents for the manner in
which they treated him at Scott’s funeral and their violation of Scott’s
commitment to allow Jose to continue living in Scott’s condominium
after his death.439 The court found that the allegations
[R]eflect conduct which may have caused distress and anxiety to
plaintiff, [but] they can hardly be said to allege conduct which is
“so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go be-
yond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atro-
cious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 440
In this case, the court applied the outrageousness standard nar-
rowly by limiting its scrutiny of a relationship, which clearly entails
both emotional and economic dependency.
Both Miller and Plaza are exemplary cases explaining why the
number of intimate liability claims brought by married couples still
dwarfs those brought by partners in new family structures, such as
cohabitation and same-sex partnerships. In addition to the skepti-
cism of scholars and the reluctance of courts and juries to scrutinize
the economic dependencies arising from these relationships, the ste-
reotyped narratives promoted by political reformers have not favored
these cases. Whereas feminists have narrowed their focus on apply-
ing IIED to heteronormative relationships where they can play out
the gender conflict of women against men, social conservative reform-
ers have discouraged claims between cohabitants that would lead to
acknowledging intimate relations outside of wedlock.441
CONCLUSION
Influenced by a family/market distinction in private law, tort
and family law scholars are ready to compensate emotional harm
when it arises in the commercial, rather than the domestic and
intimate, sphere. In pushing emotional harm away from tort and
into the narrow contours of family law—called FL1 by family law ex-
ceptionalism scholars—they imply that tort law should compensate
emotional harm that arises in the situation of economic, rather than
affective, dependency.
438. Plaza v. Estate of Wisser, 626 N.Y.S.2d 446, 449 (App. Div. 1995).
439. Id. at 450.
440. Id. at 452 (quoting Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. 1993)).
441. See Nicola, supra note 20, at 676.
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Both feminists and social conservatives who defend their proposed
law reforms and litigation outcomes deploy stereotyped gender nar-
ratives based on traditional families and heterosexual relationships.442
These stereotyped narratives prevent many plaintiffs who have suf-
fered emotional harm in intimate relationships but who do not fit the
stereotypes from obtaining relief.
Finally, in relying on contingency fee agreements, tort lawyers
are unlikely to represent clients who have been emotionally harmed
by their partners and are excluded by liability insurance. Tort law-
yers litigating these cases are aware that if they are not likely to win,
they will have to absorb a loss. Although these claims are limited,
they hold the potential to shape intimate liability and to include new
plaintiffs representing a changing social reality in family life.
Neglected by tort scholars and hijacked by political reformers
in the past decades, intimate liability has lost, rather than revamped,
the possibility to redress emotional harm between spouses, cohabi-
tants, and same-sex partners. This article suggests that a stand-alone
tort remedy could redress emotional harm between intimate partners
whose relationships do not fit a one-size-fits-all version of “happy
families” and instead include cohabitation and same-sex partner-
ship.443 By breaking apart the bonds that link intimate liability to
marriage and heteronormative relationships, tort law offers a unique
possibility to redress emotional harm and compensate plaintiffs in
intimate relations. In supplementing family law, tort law offers an im-
portant remedy to address stand-alone emotional harm suffered by
plaintiffs in the context of economic, as well as affective, dependency.
In each case, courts and juries will need to evaluate how emotional
harm arose from the specific economic and affective circumstances
of each relationship.
442. Id. at 676–77.
443. See STACEY, supra note 279, at 4.
